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The resolution of the Taiwan question remains a strategic goal for the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and the United States. The current impasse in cross-
strait relations and dialogue brings about important questions for all parties involved in 
the longstanding dispute. How do the PRC and Taiwan get back to the process of 
constructive dialogue and away from potential military confrontation? What role should 
the United States play in resolving cross-strait tensions? These questions are the primary 
focus of this thesis. 
By examining the U.S. role in the Taiwan question from the perspective of 
conflict resolution, policymakers can identify common ground between each side and use 
this as the basis for maintaining stability and developing constructive dialogue. The goal 
of this dialogue is to develop ideas and options for policymakers to reduce the likelihood 
of conflict and to lead to the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. By being 
proactive and building a framework for improved dialogue, each party involved can 
avoid miscalculations and misperceptions that may derail efforts toward peace. 
The methodology used in this thesis applies conflict resolution approaches 
developed by Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman, Andrea Schnieder, P. Terrance 
Hopmann, I. William Zartman, Maureen Berman, and William Ury. This thesis focuses 
first on problem identification to determine the principal cross-strait differences between 
the PRC and Taiwan. Second, an analysis of these differences serves to separate the 
stated positions or outward symptoms of each side from their underlying interests that 
 xii 
can provide a proper remedy for problems. By having the PRC and Taiwan come to value 
common strategic interests more than their respective positions, each side reduces the 
likelihood of conflict, promotes stability, and opens mechanisms to develop constructive 
dialogue. 
This thesis explores various approaches to bridge the cross-strait divide by 
emphasizing interests over positions. It argues that the key to future stability in the 
Taiwan Strait is shaping a situation that allows each party to gain the will to want to settle 
and come to view cooperation as the means to a peaceful end. The principal approach to 
achieve a peaceful settlement of differences involves integrating the cross-strait 
communities and agreeing to disagree on the meaning of “one China.” An action plan to 
resolve the Taiwan question peacefully must come about from a strategy of mutually 
assured peace. In implementing this plan, each side can remove precepts for resuming 
talks, downplay the militarization of the Taiwan Strait, and eventually integrate via 
improved cross-strait links. 
Finally, the thesis recommends that the United States play a supportive, balanced 
role and allow the PRC and Taiwan to reconcile cross-strait differences on their own. By 
maintaining a posture of strategic ambiguity and a cross-strait policy built on the three 
communiqués and the TRA, the United States can reduce the likelihood of future conflict 
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A. THESIS QUESTION 
The peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences between the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and Taiwan has been an important issue for the past fifty years. The 
Taiwan Strait remains a possible flashpoint and is potentially one of the most 
destabilizing issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Even though PRC, Taiwanese, and U.S. 
officials have put forward various policy positions on this issue in the past, the question 
of Taiwan’s future remains undetermined. The impasse in cross-strait dialogue between 
the PRC and Taiwan raises important questions for U.S. policymakers. How do both 
parties get back to the process of dialogue and away from potential military 
confrontation? Is their hope for a peacefully negotiated settlement in the future realistic? 
What role should the United States play in resolving cross-strait tensions? How does U.S. 
policy toward each party shape the dynamics of potential conflict resolution? The 
purpose of this thesis is to identify common ground between all parties that might 
become the basis of efforts to maintain stability and develop constructive dialogue to 
resolve the Taiwan question peacefully. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Taiwan question has remained an ongoing dispute between the PRC and 
Taiwan since the Chinese Civil War reached an impasse in 1950. In the last decade, the 
PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a renegade province and Taiwan’s counter claim of de-facto 
independence based on historical factors has emerged as the principal issue dividing both 
parties. As a result, the Taiwan Strait remains one of the most dangerous flashpoints for 
 2 
the eruption of full-scale conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC, Taiwan, and the 
United States have been the principal actors in addressing cross-strait tensions and are the 
critical participants in efforts to resolve the issue peacefully. The complex triangular 
relationship that has evolved continues to be unsettled as all sides attempt to safeguard 
their national interests. 
The United States has been both an observer and participant in cross-strait 
relations. Both sides have viewed U.S. policy as inconsistent, and this has often been the 
focal point of tensions. This uneasy interaction has resulted in direct U.S. military 
intervention to maintain peace in the strait during crises in 1954, 1958, and most recently 
in 1995-1996.1 All of these past crises developed quickly and without many escalatory 
actions. The United States made a show of military force and then pursued diplomatic 
dialogue to address these crises, each of which having the potential to erupt into full-scale 
conflict between the parties involved. 
Cross-strait tensions have elevated again following Lee Teng-hui’s 1999 “special 
state-to-state-relationship” statement, made during an interview while he was still serving 
as Taiwan’s president. In this controversial move, Taipei introduced two new elements to 
cross-strait relations. First, Lee proposed that negotiations with the PRC should continue 
to move forward only after the PRC recognized Taiwan as an equal political entity. 
Secondly, Taiwan rejected the “one country, two systems” formula for reunification put 
                                                 
1 For a review of the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises see “First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu 
Islands” and “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands 23 August 1958 – 01 January 1959”, FAS 
Military Analysis Network, Available [Online]:<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/quemoy_matsu.htm>  [20 
January 2001]. For various analyses of the 1995-1996 crisis see James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs ed., Crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997). 
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forth by the PRC.2 This event sent an additional jolt to the prospects for improved cross-
strait dialogue that the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis had derailed. The election of a 
Taiwanese pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Chen Shui-
bian, in May 2000, resulted in a continued pause in constructive dialogue between the 
PRC and Taiwan. The PRC viewed both of these events in a negative light and responded 
in a predictably aggressive manner by reiterating its readiness to use force if Taiwan 
moved closer toward outright independence.3 
The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and other more recent cross-strait differences 
have led Beijing to suspend what seemed to be an improving agenda of dialogue with 
Taiwan during the early 1990s. Additionally, the PRC has demanded that Taiwan 
renounce the inference of being a coequal political entity and accept the PRC’s “one 
China, two systems” formula as a condition for the resumption of dialogue between the 
two parties. Throughout these heated exchanges, the United States has attempted to back 
its long-standing policy of encouraging dialogue between both sides in hope of resolving 
the Taiwan question peacefully. Taiwan’s new president, Chen Shui-bian, has responded 
to Beijing’s ultimatum by continuing to seek the status of a coequal with the PRC in any 
                                                 
2 See “Li Teng-hui Says Taiwan, China Two Separate Nations”, Taipei, FBIS-CHI-1999-0711, 11 July 1999, See 
also “Li Teng-hui Explains Cross-Strait Ties”, Taipei, FBIS-CHI-1999-0720, 20 July 1999. 
3 The PRC has threatened the use of force to achieve reunification with Taiwan under the so-called “three ifs”: 
“…if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded 
and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits 
reunification through negotiations...”, “China’s National Defense in 2000”, White Paper published by the Information 
Office of State Council, People’s Republic of China, Available [Online]: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2791.htm> 
[25 October 2000], See also “The One-China Principle And the Taiwan Issue”, The Taiwan Affairs Office & the 
Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, February 2000, Beijing, Beijing Review, March 6, 
2000, 18-19, and “China’s National Defense”, published by the Information Office of the State Council, People’s 
Republic of China, July 1998, Beijing, Beijing Review, August 10-16, 1998, 15.  Although no official PRC statement 
exists, an additional event that may trigger PRC use of force would be a decision by Taiwan to develop nuclear 
weapons. See Phillip C. Saunders, “Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait”, Seminar Report, 
May 12-13 2000, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 10-11, Available 
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future negotiation process and refusing to accept the PRC formula for talks. He also made 
clear, however, his intention of not pursuing a policy of outright independence.4 
As U.S. policymakers in President George W. Bush’s administration address this 
issue, it will be important to assess what common ground exists among the parties 
involved. Stable cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei contribute directly to 
maintaining stability and promoting economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. 
These principal U.S. national interests will continue to be pillars of U.S. foreign policy 
into the future. The manner in which the United States handles the Taiwan question will 
have significant consequences for the entire security environment in East Asia. 
Therefore, a top U.S. policy priority must be an analysis of possible methods to promote 
stability in the longstanding dispute that allows the two parties to develop some form of 
peaceful, constructive dialogue. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the U.S. role in the Taiwan standoff from the perspective of 
conflict resolution. The approach used in analyzing this comprehensive problem focuses 
primarily on developing a feasible process to manage cross-strait differences rather than 
discovering a panacea for reconciliation. The ultimate goal of this method is to provide a 
means to an end, and not the answer to the dilemma. By developing ideas and options for 
                                                 
[Online]: <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/strait/index.htm>.     
4 President Chen has advocated wanting to avoid conflict with the PRC and moving toward the direction of 
reconciliation and improved dialogue. He has also emphasized Taiwan’s right to self-determination in working toward 
efforts to achieve a “win-win” situation. See President Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech, “Taiwan Stands Up: 
Advancing to an Uplifting Era”, Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm> [27 January 2001], “National Day Message Chen Shui-bian President 
Republic of China”, Republic of China Government Information Office, October 10, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/chen/891010.htm> [31 October 2000], and an interview with President 
Chen conducted by Lally Weymouth, “We do not want Conflict”, Newsweek, April 17, 2000, 37. 
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policymakers that reduce the likelihood of conflict, the Taiwan question can be resolved 
peacefully. 
The methodology used in this thesis comes primarily from a 1994 Harvard 
Negotiation Project book addressing international conflict entitled Beyond Machiavelli: 
Tools for Coping with Conflict.5 The authors explain that advice for a decisionmaker 
must be purposive, not reactive. This concept focuses on developing a forward-looking 
policy designed to further an interest rather than responding to specific actions of other 
parties involved. By being proactive in building a framework for improved dialogue, each 
party involved can reduce the likelihood that miscalculations and misperceptions may 
derail efforts toward peace. Additionally, this method emphasizes the fact that “framing a 
problem in a skillful way is often the key to managing it.”6 
Each party involved in a conflict has a different view of what the outcome should 
be. Therefore, this thesis focuses on setting up a useful framework for improving the 
process of how the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States deal with cross-strait relations. 
The conflict resolution model used consists of four distinct categories: 
• Problem Identification 
• Diagnosis 
• Approach 
• Action Plan7 
                                                 
5 Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman, and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with 
Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
6 Ibid, 14. 
7 Ibid, 70. 
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This model can help develop a viable long-term peace process and incorporates conflict 
resolution work completed by P. Terrance Hopmann, I. William Zartman, Maureen R. 
Berman, and William Ury.8 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis has four main sections corresponding to the conflict resolution model. 
Chapter II, “Identifying Cross-Strait Differences” identifies principal cross-strait 
differences, especially issues relating to maintaining stability and improving constructive 
dialogue between the parties involved. 
Chapter III, “Setting an Agenda to Attack the Problem” examines the various 
methods used in diagnosing the problems identified in the dispute. This chapter also 
discusses the various positions each party takes in observing the conflict and analyzes 
what obstacles hinder resolving the issue peacefully. 
Chapter IV, “Building a Bridge between Both Sides of the Strait” analyzes several 
possible approaches to implement an agenda to work toward resolving the issue 
peacefully and reduce the likelihood of future conflict. 
Chapter V, “Conclusion” advances the arguments to achieve stability and develop 
constructive dialogue between all parties involved. This final chapter recommends U.S. 
policy options that best support these goals. 
                                                 
8 P. Terrance Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts, (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1996), I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman place emphasis on a three 
phase process of negotiation consisting of diagnosis, formula construction, and agreement on details. I. William 
Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982)., William Ury 
in his work with Roger Fisher focuses on an alternative to standard positional bargaining over an issue referred to as 
“principled negotiation or negotiation on the merits.” This approach focuses on four basic elements: (1) separating the 
people from the problem; (2) focusing on interests, not positions; (3) generating a variety of possibilities before 
deciding what to do; and (4) insisting that the result be based on some objective standard. Roger Fisher and William 
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The first category in the conflict resolution model involves problem identification. 
Laying out the primary cross-strait differences between the PRC and Taiwan is the 
essential first step in formulating a useful framework for maintaining stability and 
developing constructive dialogue. Two problems divide the PRC and Taiwan over the 
Taiwan question: 
• The unresolved Chinese Civil War that brings about different 
interpretations of historical circumstances and cements the cross-strait 
division 
• The evolution of different political systems on each side of the strait, 
which continues to polarize cross-strait viewpoints and foster the 
development of opposing national identities 
These issues set the contextual nature of how each party views the dispute and serve to 
further complicate U.S. policy toward cross-strait relations. Analyzing historical cross-
strait divisions and the evolution of current political systems and national identities can 
assist in developing a foundation for future conflict resolution.  
A. THE HISTORICAL DIVIDE 
Taiwan is located approximately 100 miles off the southeast coast of mainland 
China. During the 16th century, Portuguese explorers called the island “Ilha Formosa” or 
“beautiful isle.”9 General Douglas MacArthur later described Taiwan as an “unsinkable 
aircraft carrier” that dominates the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the East 
                                                 
Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, (New York: Penguin, 1991).  
9 Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui uses this description as he sketches out a brief historical overview of 
the island to show “the complexity of Taiwan’s history and the trials the people of Taiwan have had to endure.”, See 
Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity, (Tokyo: PHP Institute, Inc., 1999), 19-20, For a 
more detailed overview of Taiwan’s geography and history see John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?, 
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and South China Seas.10 Dutch traders colonized Taiwan and claimed the island in 1624. 
In 1664, Ming dynasty loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung fled to Taiwan from the mainland 
and expelled the Dutch. Eventually the Qing empire incorporated the island in 1683 and 
ruled Taiwan as a prefecture before designating it a formal province in 1887. Eight years 
later Taiwan became Japan’s first colony as a concession following the Sino-Japanese 
War and remained in that status until the conclusion of World War II.11 
As World War II came to a close Japanese dominance in the Asia-Pacific region 
ended and Taiwan returned to Chinese rule. The 1943 Cairo Declaration had 
predetermined mainland China’s claims to Taiwan during the war. On the eve of the 
war’s end, the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 subsequently reaffirmed that fate. 
Taiwan’s future radically changed under these agreements, as Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist government in China, accepted the surrender from Japanese forces, and took 
over the administration of the island in 1945.12 Taiwan became an essential asset to 
Chiang’s efforts to unify China under the Republic of China (ROC) and a critical 
strategic outpost from which the Kuomingtang (KMT) could support war efforts against 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces on the mainland.  
                                                 
Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 1-49.   
10 Taiwan has historically been viewed by mainland China as a strategic territorial possession based on some of 
the factors discussed by General MacArthur. See Foreign Relations, 1950, Volume VII, 162. 
11 PRC official statements identify the Treaty of Shimonoseki as an unequal treaty following the Japanese “war of 
aggression against China” and that Japan forcibly occupied Taiwan in 1895. See “The One-China Principle and the 
Taiwan issue”, white paper released by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, 
People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2000, Available [Online]: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/> [16 
June 2000], For a detailed historical overview of Taiwan from a U.S. perspective see “Background Notes: Taiwan, 
August 1999”, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. State Department, 
Available[Online]:<http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/taiwan_899_bgn.html> [27 January 2001]. 
12 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1997), 136-137, 142 and Copper, 32-36. 
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The need to maintain stability and order on Taiwan became a pressing concern for 
the KMT as it suffered progressive military defeats at the hands of CCP forces on the 
mainland. The KMT treated many residents of Taiwan as Japanese collaborators, a policy 
that resulted in an authoritarian crackdown on any perceived opposition to imposed rule 
from the mainland. The KMT forced Taiwanese independence movements underground 
during this period and they would not surface overtly again until the formation of the 
DPP in the 1980s. As KMT forces retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the authority of the ROC 
government transferred to Taipei from mainland China. This event created a tactical 
impasse for Mao Tse-tung’s communist forces on the mainland and set the stage for later 
U.S. intervention into the conflict. 
U.S. policy toward China had a lack of direction and purpose during the post-
World War II period as Europe received primary attention. Although U.S. policymakers 
wanted a stable China to assume a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region, no definitive 
and consistent course of action was set to assist the KMT government in achieving this 
goal. This position was evident in December 1945 when President Truman stated: 
The United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary 
to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the 
Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in 
these matters would be inappropriate.13 
Ideally, the United States looked to the KMT government to resolve differences 
peacefully with the CCP and form a unified China under a democratic governing system 
without outside interference. The United States held hope that a “strong, united and 
                                                 
13 Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China, December 15, 1945, in Department of 
State, United States Relations with China, 609. For additional information on U.S. policy toward China during this 
period see Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), and 
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democratic China” would emerge in which KMT, CCP, and other parties would compete 
through electoral politics rather than war.14 To the dismay of U.S. policymakers, 
communist victory on the mainland took hold as the PRC formed on October 1, 1949. 
From the U.S. perspective, the “loss of China” served as a watershed event and 
contributed directly to a shift of foreign policy focus from Europe to Asia in order to deal 
with a growing threat of communist expansion. 
The outcome of the Chinese Civil War contributed to the emergence of the Cold 
War in Asia and had a lasting impact on U.S. actions within the region.15 As the Korean 
War broke out in June 1950, the United States formally intervened in the conflict 
between the KMT and CCP. China’s future altered significantly as the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
moved into the Taiwan Strait to maintain stability, apply the strategy of containment, and 
essentially put the Civil War on hold.16 The resulting Cold War stalemate lasted another 
forty years and involved various changes in each side’s cross-strait policies. 
KMT foreign policy goals from 1950 to 1971 focused on limiting Beijing’s claims 
to be the legitimate government of China regardless of the outcome of the Civil War. The 
KMT looked to form anti-communist alliances, improve relations with the United States, 
prevent the PRC from entering the United Nations, and discourage nations that still 
maintained official relations with the ROC government from switching sides.17 The 
                                                 
“Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff” (PPS 39), Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. VIII. 
14 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War 1901-1949, (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1995), 312.  
15 See Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 
22-29. 
16 Ibid, 46-53. 
17 Yu San Wang, Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, (New York: Praeger, 1990), 2. 
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United States and many other countries continued to maintain ties with Taipei until 
various changes in the Cold War dictated another path. 
Although the Cold War gave rise to various cross-strait confrontations, the two 
most significant shifts in the Taiwan question occurred when:  
• The PRC took over the China seat in the United Nations (UN) in October 
1971 
• The United States officially recognized the PRC as the legitimate 
government in China on January 1, 1979 
These watershed events set back Taiwan’s efforts to maintain legitimacy in the 
international system and reinforced PRC claims that there is only “one China.” These 
events also resulted in the development of new political, military, and economic 
strategies by all parties involved in the cross-strait dilemma. Although several Taiwan 
Strait crises erupted after 1950, both sides accepted political and diplomatic venues, such 
as competitions over obtaining formal recognition from other nations, as the primary 
battleground to resolve disputes. However, the unresolved Chinese Civil War has 
remained a principal problem in settling the Taiwan question peacefully based on 
historical interpretations of Taiwan’s status.   
1. PRC Claim that Taiwan is a Renegade Province 
Beijing views Taiwan as a renegade province in strict geographic terms and does 
not normally use this description in official statements. However, the “political Taiwan,” 
that remains focused on maintaining a “de facto” autonomous stature in the international 
system, is viewed by Beijing as the primary negative component in efforts to resolve the 
issue peacefully. Throughout most of the Cold War, the PRC was satisfied with 
maintaining the status quo in its approach to dealing with cross-strait issues in order to 
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focus on pressing external threats and domestic modernization and political issues. U.S. 
intervention at the onset of the Korean War curtailed Mao’s efforts to reunify the island 
by force, sparking PRC leaders to develop new strategies to deal with Taiwan. As the 
succession of power in the PRC passed from Mao to Deng Xiaoping, a more pragmatic 
approach toward the Taiwan question emerged. As Maurice Meisner states: 
Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan, demanding the reunification of the island 
with the mainland—by peaceful means if possible, by military force if 
necessary—remained essentially unchanged during the Deng era.18 
By using verbal threats and shows of military force, Beijing made clear its claim over 
Taiwan but did not take overt military actions to retake the island. 
After successfully defeating Taiwan on numerous legitimacy claims issues in the 
international system, PRC leaders did not feel a sense of urgency to resolve the Taiwan 
question.19 However, Deng did emphasize that the most important issue for the PRC was 
“the reunification of the motherland.” This resulted in the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress issuing a “Message to the Taiwan Compatriots” in January 
1979, from which the concept of “one country, two systems” evolved.20 This concept was 
                                                 
18 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, Third Edition, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1999), 529. 
19 In 1970 seventy-one nations recognized Taiwan compared to forty-eight recognizing the PRC. By the end of 
the 1970s, these numbers had radically shifted to only twenty-four countries continuing to recognize Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China compared to one hundred seventeen maintaining formal relations with the PRC. In 
1979 the PRC pronounced the Chinese Government’s position regarding peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question 
and pledged that it “will respect the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt 
reasonable policies and measures.”, Citation from “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China”, Taiwan Affairs 
Office & Information Office, State Council, The People’s Republic of 
China,Beijing,August1993,Available[Online]:<http://www.china.org.cn/English/WhitePapers/ReunificationOf…/Reuni
ficationOfChinaE.htm> [2 June 2000]. 
20 See Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland”, January 30, 1995, 
Available[Online]:<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml> [16 June 2000], Also referred to as the “eight point 
speech”. 
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the PRC’s compromise in supporting other policies to achieve peaceful reunification with 
Taiwan and maintain regional stability. 
In the 1990s, the PRC approach to settling the Taiwan issue over time faced 
drastic changes brought about by the overt efforts by Taiwan’s leaders to solidify its 
autonomous status.21 Taiwan’s transition to a multi-party democratic political system and 
the election of a DPP presidential candidate further accentuated concerns of PRC leaders 
that the Taiwan question may have to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Additionally, 
the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong under a form of “one 
country, two systems” and Macao in 1997 and 1999 respectively left Taiwan as the last 
significant barrier for the PRC to achieve full national unification. 
The PRC cites historical facts to reinforce its claim that Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of China. As stated in the February 21, 2000 white paper entitled “The One-China 
Principle in the Taiwan issue”: 
On October 1, 1949, the Central People’s Government of the PRC was 
proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become 
the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal 
representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical 
status of the Republic of China to an end.22 
                                                 
21 These efforts include continued requests for membership into the UN and other international organizations, Lee 
Teng-hui’s “special-state-to-state relations” statements, and the election of a pro-independence party candidate in the 
March 2000 presidential election. 
22 The white paper deals extensively with the PRC position on the Taiwan question. Addtionally it states: “Since 
the KMT ruling clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use the designations ‘Republic of 
China’ and ‘government of the Republic of China,’ it has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state 
sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory.” See 
“The One-China Principle and the Taiwan issue”, white paper released by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the 
Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/> [16 June 2000]. 
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The PRC has used an improved position of power in the international system to cement 
the “one China principle” and attack Taiwan’s claims of de facto autonomy. This 
competition for international recognition remains ongoing although the PRC clearly holds 
the dominant position based on its seat in the UN and wide recognition from other 
countries. 
2. Taiwan’s Claim of Sovereignty 
Taiwan’s claim to sovereignty derives from the effort of the ROC administration 
to survive and avoid either being absorbed or attacked by the PRC.23 Throughout the 
Cold War, the KMT government on Taiwan declared its ambition to unify China by 
decisively defeating CCP forces and restoring the formal ROC government on the 
mainland.24 In 1987, martial law ended on Taiwan paving the way for a more open forum 
for discussing mainland policy. As the Cold War ended a few years later, the KMT 
government drafted the 1991 “Guidelines for National Unification.” The purpose of these 
guidelines was to institutionalize the conduct of relations with the PRC and a presidential 
decree ending the state of emergency occasioned by the “Communist Rebellion” soon 
followed.25 These actions resulted from changes in Taiwan’s governing system from an 
authoritarian one-party regime to a more open democracy not dominated by 
mainlanders.26 The guidelines also complemented Taiwan’s pragmatic efforts to maintain 
stability in cross-strait relations and autonomy from the PRC. 
                                                 
23 Ralph Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1999), 28. 
24 Steven M. Goldstein, Taiwan Faces the Twenty-First Century: Continuing the ‘Miracle’, Foreign Policy 
Association, No. 312, Fall 1997, 13. 
25 Ibid, 52, See also “Guidelines for National Unification”, adopted by the National Unification Council on 
February 23, 1991, Available [Online]: <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/guidelines.htm> [8 August 2000]. 
26 Some scholars refer to this as the “Taiwanization” of the government on Taiwan. 
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Taiwan’s efforts to maintain de facto autonomy from the mainland and claims of 
sovereignty derive primarily from a ROC interpretation of historical circumstances at 
odds with that of the PRC.27 As stated by Taiwan’s Government Information Office: 
The ROC, founded in 1912, weathered foreign invasions and a civil war in 
the middle of this century, and remains to this day the only democratic and 
representative government on Chinese soil. The ROC is an established 
nation which rules a defined territory and has its own constitution, national 
flag, legal system, and armed forces.28 
However, Taiwan has not issued a formal declaration of independence from the PRC. 
The leadership in Taipei promotes its claim of sovereignty by diligent efforts to establish 
formal relations with other nations, gaining membership in various international 
organizations, and applying for UN membership. 
These factors clearly reflect the magnitude of the division between the PRC and 
Taiwan over the unresolved Chinese Civil War. Additionally, they lay the foundation for 
Taiwan’s pragmatic approach to diplomatic relations in the international system to ensure 
its survival as a separate “political entity” from the PRC. This requires Taiwan to strike a 
balance between stable relations with the mainland and efforts toward legitimacy in the 
international system. 
3. The U.S. “One China” Policy 
Because of the Korean War, the United States had to deal with established Cold 
War fronts in East Asia on the Korean peninsula and along the Taiwan Strait. At the 
conclusion of the war U.S. policy toward Taiwan fostered close relations between the two 
                                                 
27 As John Copper states: “Currently, Taiwan’s policy regarding its relationship with Beijing is officially a one-
China policy but one which promotes separation until the conditions for unification are right.”, See Copper, 167. 
28 Cited from the Republic of China Government Information Office website, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/yb97/html/ch9_p.htm> [12 May 2000]. In addition to the island of Taiwan, the ROC 
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countries, as the KMT government served as a crucial anti-communist ally in the region. 
However, these relations shifted dramatically as the Cold War evolved. An example of 
this policy approach was when the United States abrogated the 1954 “Mutual Defense 
Treaty” with Taiwan and used rapprochement with the PRC to counter Soviet power.29 
This was because vital U.S. national interests during the Cold War developed in the 
context of an overarching Soviet containment strategy that had priority over support of 
the U.S.-Taiwan security alliance. 
With the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, the U.S. 
government recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China and 
acknowledged the Chinese position that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is part 
of China.30 Additionally, the United States approved the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on 
April 10, 1979 as a rapidly developed measure to strike a balance in cross-strait tension 
based on the highly complex triangular relationship between Taiwan, the United States, 
and the PRC. The purposes of the TRA were: 
To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and 
to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the 
people of the United States and the people of Taiwan.31 
                                                 
government exercises control over Kinmen, Matsu, and the Penghus (Pescadores). 
29 The “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954” lapsed 
in 1980 after the termination of U.S. governmental relations with the ROC on January 1, 1979. 
30 As stated in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side 
of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government 
does not challenge that position.”, See “Joint Communiqué”, Peking Review, No. 9, March 3, 1972, 4-5. 
31 “Taiwan Relations Act”, Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, April 10, 1979. 
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The strategic ambiguity inherent in the document seemed to be designed to deter both 
Taiwan and the PRC from carrying out any acts of aggression that might escalate into a 
cross-strait military confrontation and provoke a U.S. military response.  
The enactment of the TRA by the legislative branch served as the first legislation 
to delineate U.S. foreign policy toward a specific foreign territory.32 The TRA augmented 
U.S. policy toward cross-strait relations that the executive branch formulated through two 
previous joint U.S.-PRC communiqués and other policy guidelines.33 These differing 
origins of policy created a contradictory framework that has often complicated the 
challenging triangular relationship between all parties. These complications are the core 
of the debate among various U.S. policymakers over strategic clarity versus ambiguity on 
the issue of defending Taiwan from unprovoked acts of PRC aggression while inhibiting 
an outright declaration of independence by Taipei. 
B. POLITICAL DISPARITY AND NATIONALISM 
Because of the long period of separation, the PRC and Taiwan have developed 
vastly different political systems and ways of life. The opposing political systems of 
communism and democracy highlight a principal division Taipei points to when resisting 
                                                 
32 John F. Copper, “The Taiwan Relations Act: A Twenty Year Record”, The Legacy of the Taiwan Relations 
Act: A Compendium of Authoritative 20th Anniversary Assessments, (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999), 
68. 
33 Three joint U.S.-PRC communiqués generally set the basis for U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. The 
first is the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 in which the United States acknowledged “that all Chinese on 
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Both governments 
also agreed to remain open to prospects for the normalization of relations. See “Joint Communique”, Peking Review, 
No. 9, March 3, 1972, 4-5. The next U.S.-PRC statement was the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America of December 15, 1978. 
In this communiqué, both sides agreed to recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979. 
See “Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between P.R.C. and U.S.A.”, Peking Review, No. 51, December 22, 1978, 
8. The final joint statement was the Taiwan Arms Communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this communiqué, the PRC 
stated that its “fundamental policy” is “to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question”. Additionally, based 
on the anticipated reduction in the military threat to Taiwan from the PRC the quantitative terms”. See “China, US 
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unification with the mainland. The CCP in the PRC controls the central government and 
develops policies to support the Party’s goals. Kenneth Lieberthal describes the PRC 
governing system as one in “which the state dominates the society.”34 In contrast, 
Taiwan’s democratic transition brought about a multi-party political system and a central 
government patterned after the U.S. separation of powers system.35 
Although ROC President Chen reaffirms the fact that “the people on the two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background,” there 
is still a dispute about the meaning of “one China.”36 The emergence of a unique 
Taiwanese national identity is a direct result of the “Taiwanization” of Taipei politics and 
sets itself widely apart from mainland influence. These differences directly influence 
cross-strait viewpoints and thus hinder efforts to maintain stability and develop 
constructive dialogue. 
1. The PRC’s Political Environment and National Identity 
The Deng era reforms that took hold after Mao’s death created a different 
environment in which the CCP governs the mainland. The revolutionary approach of 
“class struggle” in implementing policies of the state gave way to more pragmatic efforts 
focused on stepping up modernization and economic construction. Although the PRC 
moved from a Maoist-style communism to “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the 
                                                 
Issue Joint Communique”, Beijing Review, No. 34, August 23, 1982, 14-15.     
34 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1995), 181. 
35 In addition to the Executive Yuan (branch of government), Legislative Yuan, and Judicial Yuan Taiwan also 
possesses a Control Yuan and Examination Yuan. The Control Yuan serves as a quasi-judicial oversight body to check 
on officials and deter corruption. The Examination Yuan is responsible for writing and administering Western style 
civil service examinations. See Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?, 92-96. 
36 Quote is from President Chen’s inauguration speech, “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era”, 
Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 2000, Available [Online]: 
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CCP continues to maintain centralized control of the government and an authoritarian 
system of implementing policy.37 It is within this context that PRC leaders “link the issue 
of the integrity of the Chinese nation with the legitimacy of party dictatorship.”38 
The PRC continues to connect its territorial integrity to its great power self image. 
The PRC views any efforts by Taiwan to separate further from the mainland as attacking 
its principal goal of national unification after a long period of historical division. The 
CCP consistently relies on nationalism to reinforce policies put forward and upon 
ongoing efforts to maintain domestic stability. In the 1980s, Deng made the return of 
Taiwan one of the PRC’s three major tasks of the decade based on the increasingly 
attainable prospect of resolving the issue.39 By gaining control of Taiwan, the CCP would 
gain a momentous victory by achieving the vision of ending the “century of humiliation” 
and restoring the territorial integrity of China.40 
                                                 
<http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm> [14 February 2001]. 
37 “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is a term describing how Deng Xioaping integrated market-oriented 
economic reforms into a socialist style governing system in China. As Deng stated: “We should be bolder in carrying 
out reforms and opening to the outside world and in making experimentation…We will continue to advance along the 
road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”, See “Main Points of Deng Xiaoping’s Talks in Wuchang, 
Shenzen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai from 18 January to 21 February 1992”, Beijing, FBIS-CHI-93-214, 8 November 1993. 
See also “Our Work in All Fields Should Contribute to the Building of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, 
January 12, 1983 and “Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character”, June 30, 1984, Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992), Available [Online]: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/> [21 
February 2001].  
38 Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society, 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 15. 
39 Resolving the Taiwan issue seemed more attainable to the PRC based on the rapid shift in normalizing relations 
with all major world powers under the “one China” principle. The other two tasks were opposing international 
hegemonism and stepping up economic construction. However, Deng did not achieve the return of Taiwan. Ibid, 15-16. 
40 Jiang Zemin refers to the “century of humiliation” as the period “…from 1900 when the Eight-Power Allied 
Forces occupied Beijing, subjecting the Chinese nation to great humiliation and bringing the country to the verge of 
subjugation, to the year 2000 when China will enjoy a fairly comfortable life on the basis of socialism and will make 
big strides toward the goal of being prosperous and strong.”, See Jiang Zemin, “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng 
Xiaoping Theory For an All-Around Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
into the 21st Century”, Beijing Review, October 6-12, 1997, 10-11. 
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The PRC has the largest bureaucracy in the history of the world and the CCP uses 
this system to govern all major aspects of economic and social life.41 This allows PRC 
leaders to implement Taiwan policies consistently. Additionally, the CCP has the direct 
backing of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and can therefore back its diplomatic and 
political efforts with credible use of military force options.42 This accounts for the PLA 
having an active role in cross-strait policy and contributes to the nationalistic nature of 
the reunification issue. 
The PRC political system remains in a transitional period under the leadership of 
Jiang Zemin. Prospects for political stability and change in the PRC remain elusive 
because of many unpredictable variables in the near future. Assessing the future of the 
PRC affords many possible scenarios, ranging in scale from a “muddling through” the 
status quo of current reforms to a Neo-Maoist revival or post-Cold War Soviet Union-
style fragmentation.43 However, current political trends in the central party leadership 
and the positive direction Deng’s reforms have taken the PRC toward modernization will 
likely result in a centrally-guided approach toward future reform. As the PRC moves to a 
more open market-oriented economy through accession into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the CCP central leadership may face increased levels of social 
instability and disunity. The question of Taiwan and maintaining regime legitimacy 
                                                 
41 Lieberthal, 169. 
42 Unlike most military forces that owe allegiance to the nation-state the PLA owes direct allegiance to the CCP. 
This allows the CCP to direct the use of military force in support of Party goals. The most notable example of the 
problematic nature of this relationship came when the CCP used military forces to put down anti-government 
demonstrations in Tianamen Square in 1989. 
43 See Richard Baum, “China After Deng: Ten Scenarios in Search of Reality”, The China Quarterly, March 
1996. 
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become issues that are even more pressing for the CCP because of the changing domestic 
dynamics within the PRC. 
Observers suggest that political reforms may lead to the emergence of a 
democratic regime in the PRC in the near future and that the mainland could constitute “a 
fourth wave” of democratic transition in the international system.44 Although this could 
possibly be beneficial to improving cross-strait relations from some external perspectives, 
it remains unlikely and uncertain.45 Other observers argue that reaching a resolution of 
cross-strait differences would be even more difficult with two Chinese democracies. A 
more credible scenario will be the Communist Party leadership steering a middle course 
of institutionalized reforms, strengthening the state’s centrally directed pace of economic 
development, and maintaining the central authority of the CPC to preserve political 
stability. Therefore, both the PRC’s political system and national identity will remain 
divisive factors in efforts to resolve the Taiwan question. A democratic PRC in the near 
future is unlikely and not a clear panacea for reconciling the Taiwan question. 
2. The “New Taiwanese” 
The title of this section comes from a KMT campaign theme used to describe the 
new political environment in Taiwan during the December 1998 Taipei city mayoral 
election. As former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui explained: 
The image of the KMT as the party brought over from the mainland, a 
party of “outsiders,” is long out of date now. The effect of “new 
Taiwanese” is to confirm Taiwan’s identity; the term sums up the 
achievement of the Taiwanese people in having created their own 
government and having established a political system that works for them. 
                                                 
44 See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), 264-267. 
45 See Minxin Pei, “Is China Democratizing?”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 1998. 
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It reminds us all that the people of Taiwan are committed to building a 
flourishing and unbiased society.46 
This statement clearly delineates the evolution of Taiwan’s political system and the 
formation of a unique Taiwanese national identity. Unlike the KMT’s goals of unifying 
the mainland and superimposing a mainland Chinese national identity on Taiwan, the 
current system accepts the complex historical circumstances of Taiwan’s development 
and diversified cultural elements. This system strives to represent all the people of 
Taiwan under a framework of democracy and human rights. 
The Taipei government insists on the PRC reforming its political system away 
from communism toward democratic practices before unification with the mainland can 
be an option.47 This policy evolves from the strong anti-communist stance of the KMT 
regime, as well as from the new direction in which Taiwan’s political system has moved. 
Additionally, this position derives from the economic, social, and cultural gaps that 
differentiate life on Taiwan compared to that on the mainland. Consistent statements that 
“Taiwan’s future lies in the will of the Taiwanese people” reinforce the democratic 
principles the leaders in Taipei continue to emphasize as a priority on their political 
agenda. 
                                                 
46 Lee Teng-Hui, 192. 
47 The Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan published an explanation of relations across the Taiwan 
Strait stating that: “The very reason why China cannot be unified today is not, as Peking would have it, that a section of 
the Taiwan population wishes to separate itself from China, neither is it due to the ‘interference of certain foreign 
forces’. It is the political system and level of economic development in Mainland China, and its frequent large-scale 
and violent power struggles, have weakened people’s confidence in the CPC regime.”, see “Explanation of Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits”, Taipei, FBIS-CHI-94-132, 11 July 1994, In what is referred to as President Lee Teng-hui’s 
“six points speech” he stated: “…developing the Chinese culture, maintaining human dignity, safeguarding basic 
human rights, and practicing democracy and the rule of law should be the purpose of China’s unification…We hope 
that the Mainland will become more properous and more democratic so that our 1.2 billion compatriots can enjoy a life 
of freedom and prosperity.”, see “Text of speech by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui at the National Unification Council 
meeting in Taipei on 8 April”, Taipei, FBIS-CHI-95-068, 10 April 1995. 
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Although Taiwan remains outside most of the formal international system, it gains 
widespread support for its democratic governing system and the economic prosperity that 
has taken hold on the island. The “Taiwan experience” embodies the democratic 
consolidation and economic miracle that Western powers hold up as a shining example 
for other developing countries to emulate. This allows Taiwan’s leaders to capitalize on 
close unofficial relations with other powerful countries through economic integration and 
cultural exchanges, principally the United States and Japan. 
Taiwan’s evolving political system continues to encourage nationalism and 
influences the manner in which the average Taiwanese citizen views the prospects for 
unification with the mainland. The influx of native Taiwanese into the political spectrum 
has also contributed to this new sense of national identity. The 2000 presidential election 
in Taiwan completed the first succession of power under the relatively new multi-party 
democratic system. As President Chen stated in his inaugural address: 
The outcome of Taiwan’s year 2000 presidential election is not the victory 
of an individual or a political party. It is a victory of the people as well as 
a victory for democracy, because we have, while attracting global 
attention, transcended fear, threats and oppression and bravely risen to our 
feet together.48 
Taiwan’s democracy represents a broad spectrum of viewpoints, and therefore it is 
difficult to develop policy without gaining the support of the majority. It is from this 
baseline that the competing claims over sovereignty, combined with the emerging 
Taiwanese national identity, remain at the core of cross-strait tensions. 
                                                 
48 President Chen also stated that “…the significance of the alternation of political parties and of the peaceful 
transition of power lies not in that it is a change of personnel or political parties. Nor in that it is a dynastic change. 
Rather, it is the return of state and government power to the people through a democratic procedure.”, see “Taiwan 
Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era”, Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 2000, Available 
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3. U.S. Approach toward a Communist PRC and Democratic Taiwan 
U.S. policy toward cross-strait relations is set within the greater U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS) framework of “engagement” and a broad global context. Current 
U.S. strategy focuses on three core objectives in the Asia-Pacific region: 
• Enhance American security  
• Promote American economic prosperity  
• Promote democracy and human rights49 
Avoiding conflict in the Taiwan Strait directly supports all of these policy objectives. 
Additionally, the United States sees its role in the region as enhancing U.S. security by 
shaping the environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain 
future.50 
Efforts to maintain stability in cross-strait relations, support democratic reforms in 
the PRC, and reinforce current political initiatives in Taiwan fall directly in line with U.S. 
policy objectives. The United States attempts to deal with both the PRC and Taiwan 
through a similar process of engagement in order to maintain equilibrium in the triangular 
relationship and support stability by sustaining a peaceful security environment. 
However, Beijing’s domestic fear of the “peaceful evolution” theory and external 
concerns about decreasing U.S. influence in East Asia often bring about a negative 
response from PRC leaders.51 In contrast, Taiwan uses its democratic values to lobby 
                                                 
[Online]: <http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm> [14 February 2001]. 
49 National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, 5 January 2000, 34-39. Available [Online]: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html> [12 February 
2000]. 
50 Ibid, 5. 
51 The theory of “peaceful evolution” refers to a strategy that PRC conservatives assert that U.S. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles used in the 1950’s. The term describes a concept that over time market-oriented economic 
reforms and a more open political system will emerge to peacefully undermine communist regimes in favor of 
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U.S. policymakers sympathetic to their cause to secure its fragile status in the 
international system. Democratic values truly differentiate the PRC and Taiwan under 
U.S. engagement policies. 
Taiwan’s political system and efforts to establish a new Taiwanese identity 
benefit from the U.S. engagement policy by reinforcing current trends toward complete 
democratic consolidation. In sharp contrast, CCP leaders see many aspects of this 
approach as a type of “containment” strategy intended to curtail PRC efforts to gain a 
more powerful position in the international system.52 This comes about because of PRC 
views that CCP values are often at odds with those of Western style democracies and 
that, despite declarations of engagement, the United States will not accept Beijing’s 
Communist regime. While the U.S. engagement policy focuses on economic reforms, 
market opening, human rights, religious freedom, and rule of law issues, the PRC takes 
an authoritarian approach to resolving many of these issues often against democratic 
norms. This has an adverse effect on U.S. policymakers gaining consensus on the type of 
policy approach needed to deal with the PRC as well as the direction relations should 
take.53 Regardless of the debate, the growing economic and military power of the PRC 
has forced the United States to describe its future relationship as competitive. 
A principal concern of the PRC is the way in which U.S. involvement in East 
Asia manifests itself through a large military presence in the region. The United States 
maintains approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the Asia-Pacific to maintain 
                                                 
democratic principles. See Lieberthal, 215. 
52 See Paul H. B. Godwin, “Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First Century”, in Samuel S. 
Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millenium, (4th ed.: 1998), 178. 
53 See Walter Neal Anderson, “Overcoming Uncertainty: U.S.-China Strategic Relations in the 21st Century”, 
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stability and support bilateral security alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. U.S. actions in the context of the NSS 
and under the TRA also serve as an ambiguous security guarantee for Taiwan sheltering 
the island from PRC aggression. Under this security umbrella, Taiwan’s evolving 
national identity and democratic principles are sheltered from any efforts by the PRC to 
resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means. From this standpoint, the PRC 
bolsters its claim that the Taiwan question is an internal matter and any interference by a 
foreign power legitimizes the use of force by the PRC to defend its sovereign territory. 
The combination of the various U.S. approaches toward a communist PRC and 
democratic Taiwan complicates efforts to maintain stability in cross-strait relations. In 
order to achieve the core objectives of the NSS, U.S. policy needs to strike a delicate 
balance by encouraging an environment conducive to improved relations between Beijing 
and Taipei. Additionally, U.S. policymakers must recognize what aspects of engagement 
each side may view as counterproductive in efforts to maintain stability. An even-handed 
approach to cross-strait relations is essential to maintaining “equilibrium” in bilateral 
relations with the PRC and close unofficial relations with Taiwan. By enhancing stability 
and providing some predictability in its approach to cross-strait relations the United 
States can better support efforts to develop constructive dialogue between all parties 
involved in the dispute. 
                                                 
INSS Occasional Paper 29, Regional Security Series, October 1999, 5-19. 
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Diagnosing the causes of the problems identified in the previous section and 
reasons why those problems have not been resolved is the next essential step to 
developing a relevant conflict resolution framework. The Harvard Negotiation Project 
divides a potential conflict into seven elements as a mechanism to look behind a party’s 
primary position on an issue and identify its underlying interests (see Table 1).54 After 
using this type of framework as an analytical tool, policymakers can better develop an 
approach toward the dispute that will: 
• Recognize each party’s position and viewpoint; 
• Address potential obstacles; and 
• Focus on shared interests and positions while clarifying each party’s Best 
Alternative To Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)55 
By taking a problem-solving rather than a confrontational approach toward a conflict, 
decisionmakers can implement a feasible agenda for attacking the problem. This chapter 
highlights potential areas of shared interest as well as obstacles that stand in the way of 





                                                 
54 Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider, 74-82. 
55 BATNA is a concept based on the tendency for people to underestimate the costs to them, of not reaching 
agreement, and to overestimate the costs to the other side. Therefore, both sides in a dispute may fail to identify 
reasonable options if the agreement they were pursuing failed. A party’s BATNA becomes the standard against which 
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SEVEN ELEMENTS OF A CONFLICT SITUATION 
Interests: 
• Have the parties explicitly understood their own interests? 
• Do the parties understand each other’s priorities and constraints? 
Options: 
• Are sufficient options being generated? 
• Is the process of inventing separated from the process of making commitments? 
Legitimacy: 
• Have relevant precedents and other outside standards of fairness been considered? 
• Can principles be found that are persuasive to the other side? To us? 
Relationship: 
• What is the ability of the parties to work together? 
• Is there a working relationship between their negotiators? 
• Are the parties paying attention to the kind of relationship they want in the future? 
Communication: 
• Is the way the parties communicate helping or interfering with their ability to deal 
constructively with the conflict? 
• Are mechanisms in place to confirm that what is understood is in fact what was 
intended? 
Commitment: 
• Are potential commitments well-crafted? 
• Does each party know what it would like the other party to agree to? 
• If the other side said yes, is it clear who would do what tomorrow morning? 
Alternatives: 
• Does each side understand its Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement—its 
BATNA? 
• Are the negative consequences of not settling being used to bring the parties 
together 
 
Table 1. Harvard Negotiation Project Elements of a Potential Conflict. 
                                                 
any other proposed agreement is measured. See Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider, 78, and Fisher and Ury, 97-106. 
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A. RECOGNIZING EACH PARTY’S PERSPECTIVE 
The deeply embedded divisions in cross-strait relations polarize the PRC and the 
ROC on opposing sides of the Taiwan question. An underlying assumption involved in 
the diagnostic phase is that the parties involved in the dispute are willing to make an 
initial commitment to negotiate to resolve a jointly recognized conflict of interest.56 As 
Zartman and Berman point out: “Without the will to reach an agreement there will be 
none, even if the other party’s claim to participate in a solution is admitted.”57 This 
remains an important aspect of current cross-strait relations based on each side’s refusal 
to negotiate until certain precepts are in place. 
By firmly committing to a position in the cross-strait dispute, each side has 
frustrated efforts to develop constructive dialogue. Additionally, the potential for 
destabilizing events to escalate into full-scale military conflict is enhanced given the 
hardline stance each party takes. The more Beijing and Taipei view the dispute from a 
positional bargaining perspective, the more likely they will lock themselves into a contest 
of will. Therefore, the only way to work toward a peaceful solution to the Taiwan 
question is by focusing on goals that are of common interest to both sides. From this 
context, the PRC and Taiwan must accept the premise that a position is something 
decided upon and an interest is what caused you to decide.58 By analyzing each party’s 
viewpoint, policymakers can better separate the stated positions or outward symptoms of 
each side from their underlying interests that provide a remedy for the deeper problems. 
                                                 
56 Hopmann, 79. 
57 Zartman and Berman, 66. 
58 Fisher and Ury, 41. 
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1. PRC Position and Viewpoint 
Based on the longstanding problems identified in Chapter II the PRC formulates 
its policies toward the Taiwan question from the position of a rising great power needing 
to legitimize itself in the international system. PRC grand strategy focuses on achieving 
the primary national goal of becoming a strong, modernized, unified, and wealthy 
nation.59 From this position, Beijing uses the “one China principle” and peaceful 
reunification approach of “one country, two systems” as its baseline for dealing with the 
Taiwan question without considering other possible starting points. By demanding that 
Taiwan accept the “one China” policy, PRC leaders structure a situation that appears 
intractable. Additionally, using the threat of military force under the “three ifs” creates 
additional cross-strait tension, serves as a deterrent against Taiwanese independence 
movements, and elicits a response from Taipei that may be in direct opposition to the 
PRC position. 
PRC leaders have put forward various official statements defining their position 
on the Taiwan question including several white papers on the subject. The August 1993 
white paper entitled The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China states: 
Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. 
However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems 
                                                 
59 The FY 2000 Secretary of Defense “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” 
states: “The PRC government has not enunciated a ‘grand strategy’ to guide its activities and approach to international 
affairs, in the Western sense of the term. Indeed, Chinese leaders are largely preoccupied with domestic concerns, 
especially the need to maintain conditions of national unity and internal stability. We can infer from official statement 
by senior leaders, government planning documents, and government-affiliated writings that the nearest Chinese 
equivalent to a ‘grand strategy’ would be its national development strategy, which aims to comprehensively develop 
national power so that Beijing can achieve its long-term national goals.” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 
National Defense Authorization Act, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China”,Available[Online]:<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm> [12 February 2000]. See 
also Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2000). 
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necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity…The Taiwan question should and entirely can be resolved 
judiciously through bilateral consultations and within the framework of 
one China.60 
Additionally, this white paper emphasized the point that the PRC considers Taiwan an 
inalienable part of China and defined the origin of the Taiwan issue from the PRC 
perspective. A continuous rhetorical offensive reinforcing the PRC’s cross-strait position 
and asserting its willingness to use force to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence 
followed the issuance of the white paper.   
Beijing further amplified its official position on the Taiwan question in the 
February 2000 white paper, entitled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.” 
Although this paper enumerated many of the past arguments for resolving the Taiwan 
question, it responded to Lee Teng-hui’s July 1999 “special-state-to-state relations” 
statement and preceded the March 2000 presidential election on Taiwan. This white 
paper emphasized that drastic measures may be adopted to resolve the issue if “the 
Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Strait reunification 
through negotiations.” CCP leaders also pointed out that they “cannot allow the 
resolution of the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely.”61 This new sense of urgency 
to break the status quo of cross-strait deadlock was likely the result of concerns that pro-
independence movements were gaining more backing from the people on Taiwan. That 
                                                 
60 “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China”, Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, State 
Council, The People’s Republic of China, Beijing, August1993, 
Available[Online]:<http://www.china.org.cn/English/WhitePapers/ReunificationOf…/ReunificationOfChinaE.htm> [2 
June 2000]. 
61 See “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan issue”, white paper released by the Taiwan Affairs Office and 
the Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/> [16 June 2000]. 
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worry was reinforced a month after the issue of the February 2000 white paper with the 
election of the Taiwanese DPP presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian. 
Although the PRC would have preferred to deal with a one-party, KMT-led 
regime on Taiwan, CCP leaders still view cross-strait linkages as a viable strategy to 
promote future reunification. Building on Jiang Zemin’s reunification agenda set forth in 
his January 1995 eight-point speech, Beijing continues to see the importance of 
expanding economic exchanges and integration between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.62 This position supports the economic development strategy of the PRC and pulls 
Taiwan closer by linking its economic livelihood directly with that of the mainland.  
By advocating the continuation of the “three links” strategy as a viable 
mechanism for promoting reunification and maintaining stability, CCP leaders clearly 
view economic interdependence as a useful step toward unifying the motherland. In 
keeping with this approach, in January 2001 the PRC established the first direct legal link 
since 1949 to the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.63 Although the PRC prefers to establish 
more robust links directly to the island of Taiwan itself, this was a significant 
breakthrough in cross-strait relations. However, CCP leaders intentionally understated the 
importance of this event so not to provide Chen Shui-bian with any positive 
reinforcement or domestic support for his cross-strait policy. 
The Taiwan question is clearly a top priority for the PRC based on strong 
emotional and historical ties to overarching Chinese nationalism. The CCP leadership 
                                                 
62 Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland”, Beijing, 30 January 1995, FBIS-
CHI-95-019.  
63 Referred to by some as the “three mini-links.” Craig S. Smith, “Taiwan Boats Land in China: First Direct Legal 
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links reunification of Taiwan directly to PRC national sovereignty and sees it as the last 
crucial step in achieving closure to the century of humiliation. After resuming 
sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, Beijing sees reunification with Taiwan as a 
major step toward building a strong, prosperous Chinese nation. Although Beijing views 
the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question as a primary goal, CCP leaders may not 
act as a responsible rational actor if provoked into action vis-à-vis moves toward Taiwan 
independence. It is from this defined position and viewpoint that efforts to resolve the 
Taiwan question peacefully proceed under Beijing’s reunification policies. 
2. Taiwan Position and Viewpoint 
Taiwan policies toward cross-strait relations find their basis in many of the 
problems previously identified, but they differ from the PRC perspective in the approach 
taken toward the unification issue. Taiwan must be more cautious than the PRC in 
proceeding toward various unification options based on a variety of internal and external 
factors that deal directly with issues of sovereignty. This forces the leaders in Taipei to 
take a calculative, pragmatic stance toward the PRC and issues of unification in order to 
ensure regime survival in the international system. Taiwan’s viewpoint is evident in 
President Chen’s recent political gestures to work with Beijing in the “spirit of the 1992” 
talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) held previously.64 This position focuses on opening 
                                                 
Link Since ‘49”, New York Times, January 2, 2001. 
64 SEF and ARATS are quasi-official organizations established in 1991 by Taiwan and the PRC respectively to 
negotiate with each other to resolve problems arising in people-to-people relations across the strait. The “spirit of 1992” 
refers to dialogue between Taiwan and the PRC that resulted in talks between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu and his 
mainland counterpart ARATS chairman Wang Daohan in Singapore in April 1993. These bilateral negotiations resulted 
in the signing of agreements on authentication of legal documents and the handling of registered mail. See Clough, 34-
35. According to the PRC, these talks also resulted in Taiwan accepting a consensus on the meaning of “one China” 
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up talks with the PRC and developing constructive cross-strait dialogue that can be based 
on “agreeing to disagree” on each sides interpretation of the “one China principle.”65 
Only by maintaining this positional difference from Beijing can the leaders in Taipei 
control domestic political pressure and yet attempt to maintain cross-strait parity with the 
PRC. 
The public political spectrum is much more diverse on Taiwan than in the PRC 
and thus complicates the manner in which the leaders in Taipei must gain consensus over 
cross-strait policy formulation. Unlike mainland politics in which the CCP central 
leadership dominates, the KMT maintains a majority in the Legislative Yuan while a DPP 
president serves as Taiwan’s chief executive. This division threatens gridlock in policy 
formulation, implementation, and efforts to define Taiwan’s position on cross-strait 
relations. Each branch of government must constantly balance the potential negative 
impact a policy decision may have on issues of national security, economic development, 
and regime stability. Taiwan’s political system, like its counterpart in the United States, 
has numerous checks and balances that hinder any one political party from dominating 
the policymaking forum. Therefore, as political decisions move toward implementation 
both the open press and various constituents ultimately hold political representatives 
accountable. 
                                                 
and that this should be the basis for further dialogue. However, Taiwanese government officials have disputed this fact 
and instead posit that no consensus over the meaning of the “one China” was reached. See David Brown, “Dialogue in 
Neutral: Private Sector in Gear”, Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, 4th Quarter 2000, Available 
[Online]:<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/004Qchina_taiwan.html> [31 October 2000], “No 1992 Consensus, MAC 
Chief Says”, China Post, October 20, 2000, Available [Online]:<http://www.taiwansecurity.org/News/CP-102000.htm> 
[25 October 2000], and “Presidential Group Urges Beijing to Resume Talks on 1992-93 Spirit”, Central News Agency, 
October 12, 2000, Taipei, Available [Online]:<http://www.taiwansecurity.org/CAN/CAN-101400.htm> [31 October 
2000]. 
65 “Taking the Lead”, Interview with Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 
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President Chen has shown a great deal of consistency in supporting Taipei’s 
existing cross-strait position. His open support for the National Unification Guidelines, 
economic links to the mainland, and the current KMT-developed constitution are 
consistent with the current direction cross-strait policy is moving. This seems to be a 
more risk-averse approach in comparison to his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui. Additionally, 
Chen has distanced himself from the DPP independence platform in order to gain support 
from the KMT and maintain stability. This cautious approach also finds its basis in the 
lack of majority public backing for a DPP-focused political agenda, as evident by the 
closely divided March 2000 election results. 
As domestic factors and external political dynamics shape Taiwan’s perspective 
toward cross-strait relations, the PRC remains the primary security concern and military 
threat. In order to address the PRC threat, Taiwan views its relationship with the United 
States as the cornerstone of its national security policy. Advanced U.S. arms sales via the 
TRA and forward U.S. military presence in the region remain two principal focal points 
of Taiwan’s national security strategy. A withdrawal of U.S. support via the dissolution 
of the TRA would effectively remove a significant deterrent of PRC use of force 
contingencies. Taiwan understands this aspect of regime survival and wants to continue 
to use the TRA to force PRC leaders to weigh costs and benefits in any potential use of 
force scenario to resolve the cross-strait dispute. Regardless of what approach to cross-
strait relations Taiwan takes, Taipei leaders will continue to view maintaining close 
unofficial relations with the United States as a strategic necessity. 
                                                 
26, 2000, Available [Online]: <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2000/s20001020taking.htm> [20 October 2000]. 
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3. U.S. Position and Viewpoint 
Regardless of each side’s interpretation of U.S. foreign policy, the United States 
views maintaining regional stability and the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences 
as a top priority in East Asia. The United States remains inextricably linked to both the 
PRC and Taiwan and must therefore develop a balanced policy approach that shapes the 
regional environment to support U.S. national interests. The three pillars of the U.S. 
position toward cross-strait relations are: 
• An unchanged U.S. “one China” policy 
• An abiding interest that there be a peaceful approach by both sides to 
resolving differences 
• Supporting constructive dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan to serve as 
the best way for differences to be resolved66 
Under this overarching position, U.S. policymakers seek the status of an unbiased third 
party observer.67 This approach rules out the option for the United States to take an active 
mediation role in the dispute such as that assumed during the recent Middle East Peace 
Process. Additionally, it promotes policies that maintain “equilibrium” in bilateral 
relations with the PRC and close unofficial relations with Taiwan. 
Each U.S. administration since the normalization of relations with the PRC in 
1979 has kept to a similar cross-strait policy position. Official recognition of the PRC as 
the sole legal government of China and maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan via the 
TRA have been the standards consistently applied. When the United States signed the 
                                                 
66 Susan L. Shirk, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Asia and Pacific Subcommittee 
on HR 1838, The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, September 15, 1999, 3.  
67 P. J. Crowley, spokesman for the National Security Council, stated that: “We are not playing a role as a 
mediator, and we have not and do not seek to play that role.”  “U.S. Seeks to Avoid Role as China-Taiwan Mediator”, 
Washington Post, May 14, 2000, 12, Available [Online]: <http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2000/e200051seeks.htm> [15 May 
2000]. 
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August 1982 joint communiqué with the PRC, there was the potential for a shift to occur 
in the contextual nature of the complex triangular relationship previously established. 
However, the Reagan administration quickly balanced the potential policy tilt by giving 
Taiwan six verbal assurances that the United States would not: 
• Set a date for ending arms sales 
• Hold prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan 
• Mediate between Beijing and Taipei 
• Press Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC 
• Revise the TRA 
• Change its position concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty68 
Subsequent U.S. administrations have continued to support the six assurances despite the 
fact that they have never been incorporated into a formal agreement. The six assurances, 
in concert with the more recent 1994 President Clinton Taiwan policy review (TPR), 
have kept unofficial relations with Taiwan on par with the U.S. engagement strategy 
toward the PRC.69 
Another critical aspect of the U.S. position and viewpoint is an overriding interest 
in promoting economic prosperity. Through peaceful, constructive cross-strait dialogue 
the United States can better benefit from the massive trade conducted with both the PRC 
and Taiwan. If tensions across the strait can be reduced the potential for military conflicts 
                                                 
68 See June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Attitude Toward the Taiwan Relations Act”, The Legacy of the Taiwan 
Relations Act: A Compendium of Authoritative 20th Anniversary Assessments, (Taipei: Government Information 
Office, 1999), 123-124, and Larry M. Wortzel, “Why the Administration Should Reaffirm the ‘Six Assurances’ to 
Taiwan”, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1352, March 16, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.heritage.org/library/bacgrounder/bg1352.html> [6 April 2001].  
69 Although no text or factsheet of the 1994 Taiwan policy review was released, it is believed to be embodied in 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 28. See “Taiwan Policy [Possible] Presidential Decision Directive PDD 28”, 7 
September 1994, Available [Online]: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-28.htm> [19 May 2000]. 
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to derail regional economic conditions decrease considerably. Therefore, the United 
States sees stability as promoting economic prosperity. 
Reducing cross-strait tensions by encouraging an environment conducive to 
improved relations between Beijing and Taipei will remain a cornerstone of the U.S. 
position in the Taiwan question. By providing stability and consistency in its approach to 
cross-strait relations, the United States can maintain “equilibrium” and balance with both 
parties. In efforts to keep the U.S. position unbiased, U.S. policymakers feel that the PRC 
and Taiwan must negotiate the dispute themselves and come to a mutually agreed upon 
solution. By exerting pressure on one side or the other the United States would 
undermine its interests in seeing the issue resolved peacefully by both parties without 
third party intervention. Therefore, a balanced, consistent, and coordinated U.S. cross-
strait policy will remain necessary no matter what administration is in office. 
B. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBSTACLES 
An essential element in setting an agenda to resolve cross-strait differences is 
addressing potential obstacles that stand in the way of efforts to peacefully resolve them. 
Although many obstacles between the PRC and Taiwan seem daunting, it is clear that 
both sides have an overriding interest in maintaining stability and avoiding conflict. In 
order to identify the requisite common ground for improved cooperation, all parties 
involved in the dispute must overcome two principal obstacles: 
• The militarization of the Taiwan Strait 
• PRC and Taiwan precepts for negotiations 
These obstacles intensify the current impasse in cross-strait dialogue and serve as barriers 
to moving forward with a peaceful agenda to resolve the longstanding conflict.  
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1. The Militarization of the Taiwan Strait 
Beijing takes a realpolitik view of international relations that justifies building a 
strong military to support its efforts to have the PRC recognized as a major world power. 
Three primary issues currently dominate the PRC foreign policy and security agenda and 
influence the manner in which PLA modernization efforts move forward: 
• Managing market oriented reforms and domestic stability while 
integrating China into the broader global economic system 
• Safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the PRC 
• Unification of the Motherland (The Taiwan question)70 
By adequately managing these national security interests, CCP leaders can effectively 
maintain the legitimacy they need to govern and achieve various nationalistic goals. 
A major factor in PRC efforts to achieve its policy objectives is the ability to 
shape the regional security environment in a manner that promotes stability. As Mel 
Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang state: “China is no different from any other state in 
thinking nationally before acting globally.”71 Therefore, the capabilities of the PLA must 
achieve a degree of advancement that can effectively challenge peer competitors and 
influence the implementation of broader PRC foreign policy and security objectives. As 
stated in the 2000 Chinese Defense White Paper: 
China’s fundamental interests lie in its domestic development and 
stability, the peace and prosperity of its surrounding regions, and the 
establishment and maintenance of a new regional security order based on 
                                                 
70 Although the PRC views the Taiwan question as an internal matter the complicated triangular relationship 
between the PRC, the United States, and Taiwan brings the issue to the foreign policy forum. After gaining back Hong 
Kong and Macao, the PRC views reunification with Taiwan as the last crucial step in unifying the motherland. 
71 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 59. 
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the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence…China pursues a national 
defense policy that is defensive in nature.72 
This statement clearly reflects Beijing’s goal of having other major powers view the PRC 
as a responsible actor in the international system that carries out a peaceful foreign policy 
agenda with benign intentions. It also highlights the need to build a military capable of 
projecting power in areas on China’s periphery to promote stability, develop a new 
regional security order, and further national interests under the military doctrine of active 
defense. 
Beijing has also embraced the new dynamic of seeing the post-Cold War world 
moving away from the likelihood of major wars and toward an increase in local wars and 
armed conflicts. From this base line, CCP leaders hope to develop a military capability 
“to counter improvements to Taiwan and other regional military forces, as well as 
preparing for capabilities the United States might bring to bear in any conflict.”73 This 
position was reinforced by Beijing’s observations of U.S.-led actions in Kosovo that it 
saw as violating Serbia’s territorial sovereignty without the backing of the UN. By 
viewing the international system as a competitive environment in which nations focus on 
relative gains, the PRC views a potential conflict in its periphery as an inevitable 
outcome of “power politics.” 
Beijing’s realist perspective, which posits that “world politics continues to 
involve a zero-sum game, and in the inevitable hierarchy, the more powerful nations 
                                                 
72 China’s National Defense in 2000, White Paper published by the Information Office of State Council, People’s 
Republic of China, Available [Online]: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2791.htm> [25 October 2000] 
73 Ibid. 
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dominate the weak,” sets the tone for how it works to resolve cross-strait differences.74 
The foreign policy agenda and security goals developed under this viewpoint derive from 
strategic concepts similar to those of other major powers in the world but differ in scope 
based on the size, diversity, and vast history of China.75 In order to compete in the U.S.-
dominated international system, the CCP leaders have adopted a two-pronged strategy. 
Beijing first attempts to shape its regional environment so that policy 
implementation occurs from an advantageous position that seizes the diplomatic 
initiative. Bilateral avenues are preferred over resorting to multilateral security forums. 
Additionally, CCP leaders remain opposed to signing formal security alliances based on 
the potential loss of control in safeguarding PRC interests. This objective often times 
clashes with other countries’ efforts to promote regional cooperation and sets conditions 
for a competitive environment. Under this backdrop, Beijing resolutely opposes any 
hegemonic power constraining PRC ambitions, based on the longstanding history of 
imperialistic exploitation of China after the Opium Wars.76 
Second, the PRC seeks to deter potential hostilities that may adversely influence 
national security interests through an increased focus on improving military readiness and 
capabilities to provide proportional response to acts of aggression. The primary target of 
this strategy is what Beijing views as a U.S.-backed encirclement campaign to restrain 
                                                 
74 The Chinese refer to realpolitik as ‘power politics’ which is a policy intended solely to promote relative 
national power without regard to moral principle. Previously cited in Denny Roy, China’s Foreign Relations, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 37. 
75 For a review of various arguments of what some refer to as China’s “strategic culture” see Mark Burles and 
Adam Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 79-93. 
76 The PRC often uses the terms Hegemonism and power politics to describe how it views the manner in which 
the United States carries out its international relations. Other descriptive words used to identify U.S. actions include 
“neo-interventionism”, “neo-gunboat diplomacy”, and “neo-economic colonialism.” See China’s National Defense in 
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the PRC’s rise to a more powerful status in the international system. Several principal 
constraints that the PRC looks to counter include the: 
• Presence of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region 
• U.S.-led regional security alliances 
• Potential further remilitarization of Japan 
• Potential employment of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system in East 
Asia 
The above issues, coupled with a requirement to defend the territorial integrity of the 
PRC, are the principal reasons why Beijing feels it must develop a credible military 
option and deterrent capacity by means of a modernized PLA. 
The ongoing PRC threat to use force as a means to reunify with Taiwan creates 
the most volatile aspect of any effort to develop an agenda to resolve cross-strait 
differences. In this context, the PLA has shifted its strategic focus from “total war” to 
limited “local wars” to support overall PRC policy objectives. Current PLA 
modernization efforts and restructuring of forces center around creating a military 
capable of winning “local wars under high-technology conditions.” Within the next five 
to ten years, the PLA is likely to focus on creating a military that will provide “credible 
intimidation” and asymmetric engagement capabilities.77 This strategy would allow the 
PLA to avoid an adversary’s strength by conducting attacks on the stronger foe’s 
vulnerabilities using unexpected or innovative means. 
                                                 
2000 white paper. 
77 The procurement of Russian SU-27 aircraft, Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, and Sovremenny-class 
guided missile destroyers complement a strategy to develop a military force capable of credible intimidation. See the 
February 1999 DOD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait Security Situation. 
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In keeping with the strategy of active defense, the PLA is preparing for future 
wars that will be sudden, faster, and more intense. The PRC looks at success on the future 
battlefield based largely on the ability to destroy the enemy’s combat system rather than 
by the annihilation of enemy personnel and equipment.78 This makes it an imperative for 
the PLA to organize for future conflicts accordingly and gain the ability “to respond 
quickly and effectively in light of the differences in timing, space, opponents, and 
challenges.”79 As the PRC embarks on building a modern military force, CCP leaders 
seem to have embraced some of Sun-tzu’s classical military stratagems for achieving 
victory against ones adversary. This includes integrating the following maxim in efforts 
to build the future PLA: 
Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of 
excellence…Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the 
enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; 
and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.80 
By using a combination of political, diplomatic, and military means as described in the 
previous passage, the PRC can better compete against technologically advanced and more 
powerful military powers. This leads the PRC down the road to obtain modern military 
equipment capable of gaining control of the air and command of the sea at critical times. 
Additionally, PLA doctrine is evolving to support achieving success during the initial 
battle because of its decisive significance in modern warfare. This includes being 
                                                 
78 Cheng Jian, “Take Information Warfare as Starting Point of Military Struggle Preparations”, Beijing, 
Jiefangjun Bao, 2 Jun 98, FBIS-CHI-98-167. 
79 Colonel Fang Ning, “Defense Policy in the New Era”, in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future 
Warfare, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 54. 
80 Ralph D. Sawyer, “Sun-tzu’s Art of War”, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1993), 161. 
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unpredictable and at times striking the enemy first before he has time to mobilize and 
prepare for the engagement.81 
The PRC has consistently used the threat of force option to deter Taiwan from 
declaring outright independence. The PLA currently maintains a quantitative advantage 
over Taiwan’s military forces and has an impressive array of short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBMs) capable of inflicting major damage on various portions of Taiwan.82 However, 
the PLA lacks the capability to carry out a successful invasion of the island and has a 
limited capability to support a naval blockade of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
and Taiwan’s ports with its submarine forces. This limits the likely military course of 
action to a large-scale missile attack and/or information warfare assault designed to 
disrupt Taiwan’s economy and domestic stability. 
Across the Strait, many analysts note that Taiwan’s military forces maintain a 
qualitative advantage over the PLA.83 In the near future, Taiwan looks to maintain a 
“status quo” military balance by obtaining weapon systems and equipment that will 
deter/defeat PLA military capabilities.84 The cornerstone of Taiwan’s security is U.S. 
arms sales and security support provided through the TRA. Military development 
programs on both sides of the strait continue to be interactive in nature. Based on likely 
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PLA courses of action, Taiwan seeks to maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait 
and waters contiguous to the island. Taiwan’s force development focuses on building an 
effective counter-blockade capability and defeating an amphibious and/or aerial assault 
on the island.85 
Based on the above analysis, the United States, under the backdrop of promoting 
stability and deterring conflict, influences the cross-strait military balance through arms 
sales to Taiwan and forward military presence. These actions complicate cross-strait 
issues and force U.S. policymakers to make critical decisions under potentially adverse 
conditions. The issue of strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity comes into play, as 
the U.S. role in the Taiwan question is determined.86 Chapter IV will cover this subject in 
more detail. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis was the most recent test of U.S.-resolve 
to intervene during a potentially volatile confrontation. As the United States sent two 
aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, the ambiguous U.S. policy position 
quickly materialized into a strong show of force to maintain stability. This has been the 
only instance of direct U.S. military intervention supporting the security clause provided 
in the TRA since the formal U.S.-Taiwan security alliance lapsed. U.S. intervention 
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served to challenge PRC military capabilities, send a clear signal of resolve, and deter 
further aggressive actions. It also highlighted the need to find other conflict resolution 
mechanisms to address the negative impact the militarization of the Taiwan Strait has had 
on attempts to promote a peaceful approach to cross-strait relations. 
2. PRC and Taiwan Precepts for Negotiations 
The PRC and Taiwan have reoriented their cross-strait policies in the 1990s based 
on distinct changes in the post-Cold War international system. Both clearly saw the merit 
of improved dialogue and embraced domestic considerations in efforts to develop 
mechanisms to cooperate. As each side settled on its cross-strait position, their efforts to 
resolve differences later evolved into a negotiating deadlock with clearly stated precepts 
for initiating further quasi-official dialogue. This current impasse came about because of 
Taipei’s ongoing struggle to improve its standing in the international arena and Beijing’s 
insistence on achieving national unification under the “one China Principle.” 
In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Taiwan took advantage of the changing international system and a 
low point in U.S.-PRC relations to advance its interests.87 During this period, Japan also 
tilted away from the mainland and embraced Taiwan in various official forums such as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. Based on these and other 
changing dynamics, Taiwan saw the post-Cold War period as conducive to expanded 
foreign relations via a unique form of multilateralism that had become very familiar to 
Taiwanese policymakers since 1979. Although official diplomatic relations with many 
                                                 
87 Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35. 
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other countries were not attainable, Taiwan used the immediate post-Cold War period to 
shore up its position in the international arena and bolster its economic success. 
During the 1990s, Taiwan continued its rapid economic growth and worked 
toward ensuring its survival in the new international system by strengthening close 
unofficial ties with the United States and other Western countries. This was a vital aspect 
of Taiwan’s national security and efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition in an 
emerging multilateral system of relations. Domestic political change was also occurring 
in Taiwan during this period, as constitutional reforms took hold and made multi-party 
democratic national elections a reality.88 The transition to a multi-party democratic 
system on Taiwan brought with it tremendous domestic focus on how the government 
carried out its foreign relations. Within this context, Lee Teng-hui oversaw the drafting of 
the 1991 “Guidelines for National Unification” that institutionalized the conduct of 
relations with the PRC and appeared to move Taiwan closer to a more cooperative 
relationship with the mainland. However, the guidelines set two overriding conditions for 
the future unification of China: 
• That unification “should first respect the rights and interests of the people 
in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare” 
• That unification results in the establishment of “a democratic, free and 
equitably prosperous China”89 
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The conditions set forth in the guidelines created potential barriers to resolving cross-
strait differences based on the clear distinction between each side’s political system and 
national values. 
As Taiwan continued to pursue a pragmatic approach to cross-strait relations, Lee 
supported the April 1993 SEF-ARATS talks in Singapore to work toward improving 
dialogue on reunification issues. The Koo-Wang or Wang-Koo talks, depending on each 
side’s preference, were symbolically significant but did not provide either side with 
agreements on the proposed agenda. Follow-up talks between both parties occurred in 
November 1993 and March 1994 with no notable results.90 Although no significant 
changes occurred in cross-strait relations, the talks did place Taipei on an almost equal 
footing with its PRC counterpart in terms of negotiating power. This bolstered Lee’s 
political standing and set the conditions for a more assertive Taiwanese nationalistic 
agenda thereafter. 
Taiwan’s acquisition of a more powerful political position via dialogue with the 
PRC, robust economic trade, and expanding unofficial relations culminated in a strong 
push to reclaim UN membership in 1993. These efforts included an offer of one billion 
dollars for a seat in the General Assembly with the goal of sustaining Taiwan’s 
international profile in the face of PRC attempts to intensify its isolation.91 By using 
“money politics” as a diplomatic tool, Taiwan hoped to obtain UN recognition that could 
provide a forum to deter any PRC attempts to use force toward reunification and 
legitimize claims of “de facto” autonomy. 
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In 1994, Taiwan’s improved standing with the United States was evident in 
President Clinton’s Taiwan Policy Review (TPR). The TPR resulted in several significant 
changes in the scope of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations. Four principal policy 
adjustments were: 
• Changing the name of Taiwan’s office in the United States to the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) from the 
Coordination Council of North American Affairs (CCNAA) 
• Permitting U.S. officials of economic and technical ministries and 
agencies to visit Taiwan and meet with Taiwan officials 
• Permitting officials of the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) to visit 
ROC government ministries 
• Authorization, via the AIT, for both parties to hold bilateral economic 
dialogue at the undersecretary level92 
Although the review served to upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations, it did not go far enough to 
push the delicate balance with the PRC over the edge. Although the majority of policy 
changes were positive for Taiwan, the TPR also declared that the U.S. would not support 
Taiwan’s applications to join international organizations where statehood was a 
membership criterion.93 Additionally, the TPR left U.S. military commitment to Taiwan 
ambiguous vis-a-vis the existing TRA and failed to fully acknowledge the improved 
international status the governing authorities in Taipei were attempting to achieve. 
The PRC viewed the TPR and ongoing advanced arms sales to Taiwan during this 
period in a very negative light. Jiang Zemin took this opportunity to reach out to Taiwan 
by stating in January 1995 that “on the premise that there is only one China, we are 
prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities about any matter.”94 Although this speech 
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came as PRC-Taiwan economic relations and improved dialogue seemed to be moving in 
a positive direction, cross-strait tensions began to increase. At the time, the PRC had also 
become Taiwan’s second-largest export market after the United States. This began to 
alarm some Taiwanese leaders who felt that Taiwan was moving too rapidly toward 
economic interdependence with the PRC. This domestic concern set the context for Lee 
Teng-hui’s rejection of Jiang Zemin’s proposed formula for improved dialogue that came 
via a speech to the National Unification Council on 8 April 1995. As Lee stated: “we 
must be pragmatic and respect history, and should seek a feasible way for national 
unification based on the fact that the two shores are separately governed.”95 
Under this backdrop of increased tension, the United States approved Lee Teng-
hui’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, in June 1995.96 Lee subsequently used 
this opportunity to voice his concerns for the plight of Taiwan in the international system 
and shattered a long period of somewhat peaceful coexistence between Taiwan and the 
PRC. The outcome of this rising tension in cross-strait relations was the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Strait crisis and a move away from constructive dialogue and cooperation. 
A second crisis occurred in the region the following year--the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. The financial collapse of several rising economic powerhouses in the 
region highlighted several issues for Taiwan to address in order to continue its diplomatic 
offensive behind a strong economy. The issues identified by Taiwan included: 
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• Some severe structural problems with the financial system in Taiwan 
• A rapidly growing economic dependency with the PRC 
• Growing competition with the PRC and ASEAN countries in the 
production of labor-intensive and relatively low-tech products creating a 
need for industrial upgrading97 
Taiwan emerged from the crisis with renewed vigor in its quest to improve external 
relations, as many Western countries viewed the island as a relatively stable location for 
continued investment and trade. This event also served to reassess Taiwan’s economic 
links with the mainland in order to prepare for other future financial shocks and address 
the concerns of a growing economic interdependence with the PRC.98 
Although U.S. military support during the Strait crisis in 1996 helped assuage 
Taiwan’s fears of Beijing’s use of force option, the U.S. cross-strait policy position took 
another distinct turn during President Clinton’s official state visit to the PRC in 1998. 
During this visit he issued a “3 no’s” statement in Shanghai that ran counter to Taiwan’s 
hope for improved standing in the international system and achieving a better position 
from which to carry out negotiations with Beijing. In reiterating current U.S.-Taiwan 
policy, President Clinton stated: “we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two 
Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a 
member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”99 This statement 
effectively took away major bargaining power Taiwan had built up during previous 
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negotiations with the PRC and once again curtailed Taipei’s efforts to gain an improved 
standing in the international arena. 
Taiwan’s efforts to carry out a pragmatic approach to external relations took 
another step backward after Lee Teng-hui’s “special state to state” relations statement in 
1999. This statement amplified ongoing efforts by Lee to have Taiwan and the PRC 
viewed as equal political entities. The PRC immediately responded to the remarks with 
further hardline rhetoric, perceiving these actions as moving Taiwan closer toward an 
outright declaration of independence from the mainland.100 The PRC called for Taiwan to 
retract the “two states theory” and accept the “one China principle” as a prerequisite for 
any future dialogue. This watershed in cross-strait relations has ultimately created a more 
unstable security environment and backed each side into a position demanding opposing 
precepts for the resumption of further cross-strait dialogue. 
C. FOCUSING ON SHARED INTERESTS VICE POSITIONS 
In order to move forward and reduce the likelihood for conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait, both the PRC and Taiwan must come to value common strategic interests more 
than their respective positions on the interpretation of “one China.” As Fisher and Ury 
point out:  
As more attention is paid to positions, less attention is devoted to meeting 
the underlying concerns of the parties. Agreement becomes less likely. 
Any agreement reached may reflect a mechanical splitting of the 
difference between final positions rather than a solution carefully crafted 
to meet the legitimate interests of the parties. The result is frequently an 
agreement less satisfactory to each side than it could have been.101 
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The benefits of improved cross-strait dialogue clearly outweigh the costs of potential 
military confrontation. As Table 2 delineates, although PRC and Taiwan positions are 
diametrically opposed, many of the underlying substantive interests overlap. It is within 
this framework that the possibility for identifying common ground between both parties 
exists. 
Within a developing resolution framework, each party can use both shared 
interests and differing but complementary interests as the building blocks for working 
through cross-strait divisions. As each side makes a determined effort to support its 
respective national interests, substantive issues such as stability and economic prosperity 
can move to the forefront with constructive dialogue being the mechanism for reaching 
agreements. In reviewing each party’s incentive to negotiate, it is clear that the PRC 
possesses a stronger bargaining position based on its current standing in the international 
system and degree of relative national power. This brings about an important question for 
Taiwan. How does Taipei negotiate with Beijing and achieve any degree of gain? 
To address this question, the leaders in Taipei must view the current cross-strait 
stalemate as not conducive to a secure and prosperous future. Any dialogue must 
ultimately focus on producing something better than the results obtained by not 
negotiating. Additionally, the method of negotiating must meet two distinct objectives: 
• Not making an agreement that should be rejected; and 
• Making the most of current negotiating power so that any agreement that 
is reached will satisfy the interests of the people of Taiwan as much as 
possible102 
 
                                                 




• Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
China and the question of Taiwan is 
a domestic issue of the PRC and 
any attempt to separate Taiwan 
from China will be resolutely 
opposed 
• Taiwan must accept the “one China 
principle” as a condition for the 
resumption of cross-strait dialogue 
• The ROC is a sovereign state and no 
other government in the world has 
any legitimate claim 
• Taiwan will not accept the “one 
China principle” as the precept 
behind unification talks if the 
mainland insists that Taiwan is a 
province or part of the PRC 
Interests 
Substantive Interests Substantive Interests 
• Avoid conflict and maintain 
stability through the peaceful 
reunification of China in the form 
of “one country, two systems” 
• Safeguard sovereignty and 
territorial integrity 
• Maintain domestic political 
legitimacy 
• Promote economic prosperity 
• Avoid conflict and maintain stability 
by respecting the will of the people 
in the Taiwan area 
• Maintain de-facto independence until 
Taiwan can accept conditions for 
unification 
• Maintain the right to self-
determination through democratic 
practices 
• Promote economic prosperity 
Symbolic Interests Symbolic Interests 
• Historical claim that Taiwan is part 
of mainland China 
• China is a divided country under two 
separate governments 
Domestic Political Interests Domestic Political Interests 
• Reunification of China is an 
essential aspect of Chinese 
nationalism and is linked directly to 
regime legitimacy 
• The issue of national unification 
must be carried out under principles 
of democracy by gaining acceptance 
and majority support from the people 
of Taiwan 
 
Table 2. Cross-Strait Positions and Interests. 
It is within this context that Taiwan must develop its BATNA in addressing cross-strait 
differences. Likewise, any U.S. policy position should be supportive of Taiwan’s efforts 
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to reach an agreement but not place undue pressure to settle for a solution not conducive 
to long-term stability and cooperation across the Strait. 
Based on the PRC’s intentions to develop dialogue leading to reunification, CCP 
leaders clearly have an incentive to look forward, not back. By distancing the current 
cross-strait deadlock from past problems, current efforts to support various national 
interests can develop mutually advantageous solutions. As Fisher and Ury state: 
Negotiating hard for your interests does not mean being closed to the other 
side’s point of vew…You can hardly expect the other side to listen to your 
interests and discuss the options you suggest if you don’t take their 
interests into account and show yourself to be open to their suggestions. 
Successful negotiation requires being both firm and open.103 
With Chinese society deeply rooted in an authoritarian tradition, both the PRC and 
Taiwan cannot allow the desire to define a superior and subordinate relationship to 
counteract efforts to resolve cross-strait issues.104 It is from this baseline that efforts to 
implement a conflict resolution agenda move forward under a process of building a 
bridge to close the cross-strait divide. 
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Many skeptics enunciate a “common wisdom” approach to attempts to negotiate 
an end to civil wars. This concept posits that civil wars cannot end by negotiations 
because the stakes are much higher than wars of conquest and that adversaries forced to 
live with one another afterward will continue to carry on the pattern of hostility. 
However, a recent United States Institute of Peace study has shown this “common 
wisdom” not to be true. Six post-1945 civil wars that ended for a period of at least five 
years were stopped through a negotiated settlement: Columbia, ending in 1957; Yemen in 
1970; Sudan in 1971; Zimbabwe in 1980; Nigeria in 1970; and Greece in 1949.105 
These historical examples, as well as the will of Chinese people on both sides of 
the strait in search of a peaceful solution, provide hope that the Taiwan question can be 
resolved without future conflict. As discussed previously, the deep-rooted cross-strait 
differences between the PRC and Taiwan clearly point to a need for a more long-term 
process of resolution and reconciliation. Therefore, any conflict resolution framework 
applied must be pragmatic and flexible. As both parties in the dispute remain at disparate 
levels of recognition in the defined international system, negotiated solutions become 
difficult but not beyond achievement. As settlement is often seen as a second-best 
                                                 
105 Additionally, the American Civil War also had elements of a negotiated settlement as Federal leaders in the 
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solution, based on the need for some concessions by the opposing parties, each side must 
come to a point defined by I. William Zartman as a “mutually hurting stalemate.”106 
The key to future stability in the Taiwan Strait is shaping the situation so that each 
party gains the will to settle and to view cooperation as the means to a peaceful end. It is 
clear that the current impasse in constructive cross-strait dialogue reflects the failure of 
the mechanisms designed to manage the dispute.107 In an effort to develop overlapping 
bargaining space from the complex historical divisions, a deductive formula or approach 
to conflict resolution based on fundamental principles needs to be set forth. This 
approach finds its basis in trying to “upgrade common interests that the parties share or 
suggest new ways of conceptualizing the issue so that the problem can be resolved 
integratively.”108 
To bridge the cross-strait divide, promote stability, and develop a constructive 
dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan, a two-step approach to conflict resolution, 
emphasizing interests over positions, needs to be initiated in the near-term: 
• First, all parties must build on the ongoing integration efforts across the 
strait and their overlapping interests in stability and economic prosperity 
• Second, the SEF-ARATS meeting format or similar unofficial dialogue 
forum needs to be set up without preconditions for the resumption of talks 
Through these two broad initiatives each side can gain a better understanding of cross-
strait differences and open lines of communication that serve as conduits for working 
toward a peaceful solution. Both sides need to be willing to allow informal talks, cultural 
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and economic exchanges, and second track diplomatic efforts to begin the process of 
cooperation and reduce the negative aspects of focusing on the cross-strait military 
balance or other stated opposing positions. 
A. INTEGRATING CROSS-STRAIT COMMUNITIES 
Chen Shui-bian has advocated a historical Chinese value that places an emphasis 
on “pleasing those near and appealing to those from afar,” and “when those from afar will 
not submit, then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them.”109 This statement 
clearly delineates the need of both the PRC and Taiwan to avoid conflict at all costs and 
instead focus on peaceful means to carry out an agenda toward future integration.110 
Cultural and academic exchanges, tourism, and economic linkages can enhance mutual 
understanding and provide people on both sides of the strait with insight into the means 
to reduce potential barriers standing in the way of improved cooperation. By fostering 
such an environment of tonghe, each side can enhance regional stability leading to the 
development of constructive dialogue to address cross-strait differences.111 
1. Linking the Communities Across the Strait 
Integration between the PRC and Taiwan is already ongoing because each side 
has realized that some forms of cross-strait links are mutually beneficial. In line with this 
integration, Yung Wei argues for a new orientation for policymaking that emphasizes the 
concept of “linkage communities”: 
                                                 
creative image of negotiation rather than an image of concession and compromise.” See Hopmann, 80. 
109 Citation previously used by Chen in his inauguration speech. See “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an 
Uplifting Era”, Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm> [14 February 2001]. 
110 Integration in this context does not necessarily equate to reunification. 
111 Tonghe used in this context refers in a broad sense to integration and unification. 
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Instead of focusing our attention on the role of the state, the problems of 
sovereignty, the decisions of the elite, the legal process, and the political 
structure, we will turn more to the orientation of the population; the 
development of shared values and norms between people of different 
systems; the direction of deliberation and debate in the representative 
bodies at the central and local levels; and the overall volume as well as 
intensity of actual individual and group interactions between the two 
political systems within a partitioned society.112 
The approach described above has direct impact on the current impasse in cross-strait 
relations by emphasizing the need to move away from those obstacles previously 
identified, issues of sovereignty and opposing political systems, and focus more on 
shared interests. By removing the traditional positional bargaining aspects of the Taiwan 
question, the stage can be set for the development of a framework capable of addressing 
the principle cross-strait divisions. 
Although Beijing would like to see Taipei accept its “one country, two systems” 
approach to peaceful reunification, each party across the strait must first develop the 
understanding of the other party’s determination of what issues are truly important. In 
order to address both parties’ opposing viewpoint, both must build a bridge of 
understanding and trust. By emphasizing improved links between both sides, the different 
perceptions of relevant history, current facts, grievances, and the goals and intentions of 
each government can become more transparent and not just argumentatively addressed in 
white papers. 
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confrontation and the more likely the achievement of functional integration, which may eventually lead to peaceful 
political reunification.” See Yung Wei, “From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”: A New Conceptual 
Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations”, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 
Number 1-1998 (144), School of Law University of Maryland, 7-8. 
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A recent success story of integration efforts involves the establishment of the 
“three mini links” and Taipei’s efforts to implement its “open door” policy to encourage 
tourism. As these critical steps toward stability overcame historical cross-strait divisions, 
each side can now focus on a developmental strategy that addresses how to integrate 
further by way of entry into the WTO. This future mechanism for opening up trade and 
investment will link the opposing sides in a more cooperative relationship and overcome 
many of the obstacles that currently exist. The WTO also provides each party with a 
useful mechanism of dialogue that involves other international actors and various neutral 
forums to carry out discussions. 
2. Keeping Stability and Economic Prosperity at the Center of Cross-
Strait Relations 
The path free from future conflict revolves around the common interests of 
stability and economic prosperity. Both of these substantive interests seem to have the 
backing, in principle if not practice, of both sides. Cross-strait exchanges grew at a two-
digit rate in 2000 and included Taiwanese investment on the mainland of $1.746 billion. 
The future of cross-strait integration therefore looks bright.113 Despite the absence of 
constructive dialogue, economic factors continue to bridge the divisive nature of cross-
strait relations. Although Taipei continues to oversee economic integration with the 
mainland through the “no haste, be patient” policy, diligent efforts by Taiwanese 
                                                 
113 All the initiatives to promote increased exchanges with the mainland remain guided by the principle of not 
sacrificing the national security of Taiwan. Fan Liqing and Chen Binhua, “Opposing ‘Taiwan Independence’ and 
Promoting Reunification”, Xinhua, December 28, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.fas.org/news/china/2000/china-001228-taiwan1.htm> [20 January 2001] and Lin Chong-pin, “Goodwill 
and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei Manages the Cross-strait Relations”, The USA, Taiwan, and the PRC: 
Security and Strategy after the Elections of 2000, A Hudson Institute Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, published 
January 12, 2001, Available [Online]: <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-
oa/politics/GOODWILL20010215.htm> [21 February 2001]. 
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businessman have established an influential position in Taiwan’s mainland policymaking 
forums.114 At the current pace of Taiwanese investment on the mainland, the year 2000 
figure may account for half of Taiwan’s total foreign investment.115 
However, economic integration, like all other efforts to resolve cross-strait 
differences, needs to be managed with patience and pragmatism. As Lin Chong-pin, vice-
chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in Taiwan, states: “There’s a growing 
dependence of Taiwan’s economy on the mainland, and this is not a healthy picture.”116 
Although some in Taiwan such as Lin view growing economic interdependence 
cautiously, others see it as a stabilizing factor leading to the maintenance of peace. By 
exposing the mainland to Taiwan business interests, each side can close the gap created 
by a lack of trust and cooperation. Just as Taiwan has become more vulnerable to 
mainland influence through linked economic systems, the inverse is true for the PRC to a 
limited degree as well. 
The PRC appears to approach economic integration with Taiwan as part of a 
“united front” strategy to attract KMT-backed business interests in an effort to influence 
                                                 
114 This has resulted in the MAC sending proposed changes to the existing ‘go slow’ policy that would ease some 
restrictions on mainland bound investments. Sofia Wu, “CNA: ‘go Slow’ Policy Review Already Referred to Cabinet: 
Mac Chief”, Taipei, 2 April 2001, FBIS, Doc ID: CPP20010402000068. In contrast to easing restrictions on mainland 
investment, President Chen Shui-bian has fully endorsed the “go south” policy in which Taiwan businesses are 
encouraged to invest in Southeast Asia to lessen economic dependence on the mainland. See “Chen Reiterates ‘Go 
South’ Policy”, Central News Agency, October 23, 2000, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.taiwansecurity.org/CNA/CNA-102300.htm> [20 January 2001]. 
115 More than half of Taiwan’s mainland investments are made by high tech companies and this accounts for the 
fact that in December 2000 the PRC surpassed Taiwan to become the third largest Information Technology producer 
behind the U.S. and Japan. See Brown and “Trade Relationship with Taiwan”, Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperations, People’s Republic of China, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec_en/tga/tw/tw_en.html> [27 April 2001]. 
116 Julian Baum states that the pillars of Taiwan’s economy, electronics firms, are shifting the majority of their 
production to the mainland leading to greater economic interdependence and potential negative impacts. Cited 
previously in Julian Baum, “Dangerous Liaisons”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1999, Available [Online]: 
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Chen Shu-bian’s cross-strait policies.117 At first glance, these efforts may seem 
counterproductive to developing improved relations. However, the cross-strait exchanges 
provide an excellent venue to share ideas and interests. A strategy designed to undermine 
Chen’s credibility can eventually be used as a useful mechanism for feedback and as a 
stepping-stone to support efforts to develop dialogue that is more constructive. As 
Beijing focuses on reaching out to Taiwanese businessman, both sides will see that the 
benefits of economic development clearly outweigh the costs of future conflict. 
Additionally, the opposing values each side holds as barriers can be more effectively 
worked through in a benign environment not directly affiliated with official government 
positions or political biases. 
B. AGREEING TO DISAGREE ON THE MEANING OF “ONE CHINA” 
As each party seeks a stable and secure environment that promotes economic 
prosperity, cross-strait dialogue becomes an essential element in achieving this vision. 
Regardless of whether dialogue is occurring through second track diplomatic efforts, 
quasi-official cross-strait organizations, or official government agencies, it has to be part 
of any peaceful approach to resolve the Taiwan question. A new process of dialogue that 
allows both sides see the benefit of direct or indirect communication needs to be initiated 
in the near-term. The premise of these new talks cannot be acceptance of the PRC “one 
China principle,” the “1992 consensus,” or the “spirit of 1992.” Instead, it should be a 
more basic concept--talks about talks. From this low level, each side merely has to agree 
to disagree and move forward from there. 
                                                 
<http://www.feer.com/9903_25/p10cover.html> [22 March 2001]. 
117 “Behind the Smiles: China’s New Tactics to Woo Taiwan”, Economist, October 21-27, 2000 and Maureen 
Pao, “Hands Across the Water”, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 14, 2000, Available [Online]: 
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1. Talks About Talks 
It is unrealistic to expect that Jiang Zemin and Chen Shui-bian will sit down at the 
negotiating table in the near future and resolve the Taiwan question. However, Jiang has 
made consistent overtures to reach out to Taiwan, while Chen has been willing to do the 
same. The principal barrier, as discussed previously, is Beijing’s premise that there is 
only “one China” and Taiwan is part of China. Putting this position aside and focusing on 
stability in the strait, Jiang has made clear his position on negotiations via his 1995 eight-
point’s speech: 
It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations with the Taiwan 
authorities on the peaceful reunification of the motherland. 
Representatives from the various political parties and mass organizations 
on both sides of the Taiwan Straits can be invited to participate in such 
talks.118 
This statement, without the premise of “one China,” can be used as a possible baseline 
for a talks-about-talks forum. By emboldening political parties and mass organizations to 
take up the cause of constructive cross-strait dialogue and exchanges, each side can 
minimize positional bargaining while using underlying interests as a mechanism for 
cooperation. 
ARATS and SEF are organizations that have had dealings in the past on cross-
strait issues. They are not now conducting talks at present because Beijing cut off 
contacts after Lee Teng-hui enunciated his position of relations as based on a “state-to-
state” basis. However, Beijing must see the reasoning behind this action. Taiwan, fearing 
                                                 
<http://www.feer.com/_0012_14/p022region.html> [22 March 2001]. 
118 Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland”, Beijing, 30 January 1995, FBIS-
CHI-95-019. 
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PRC domination of the negotiation process, attempted to gain equal footing in any future 
talks and did not issue the statement in an effort to move toward outright independence. 
Chen Shui-bian has also made an effort to clarify Taiwan’s intentions and downplay any 
shift toward independence by his “four no’s” pledge to: 
• Not declare independence 
• Not change the national title 
• Not push for the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in 
the Constitution 
• Not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the 
question of independence or unification119 
If Beijing still wishes to pursue a peaceful reunification agenda that brings Taiwan under 
PRC sovereignty without disrupting each side’s economic achievements, then responding 
to Chen’s reaching out seems a logical course of action. 
2. Opening Moves 
As Richard Solomon points out, the PRC tends to follow a linear process of 
carrying out political negotiations. The first crucial step in this process is opening moves 
during which a relationship with a counterpart is established, a favorable agenda is set, 
and the other side commits to the “principles” the PRC has put forward.120 It is clear that 
the first two elements of opening moves already occurred during the previous SEF-
ARATS talks, while the third remains the problematic precondition that has stalled 
efforts to resume constructive cross-strait dialogue. The impasse stemmed from the 
PRC’s belief that reunification and legitimacy are interrelated. If leaders in Beijing were 
                                                 
119 “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era”, Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 
2000, Available [Online]: <http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm> [14 February 2001]. 
120 Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through ‘Old Friends’, (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 58-75. 
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to compromise on the one-China principle, they would run the risk of delegitimizing 
other aspects of their governing authority.121 Therefore, Beijing’s reunification strategy 
focuses not on compromise or cooperation but instead on the use of military threats and a 
pattern of international isolation against Taiwan.122 
The leaders in Beijing understand that many of these current reunification tactics 
will only push Taiwan further away and are counterproductive to developing shared 
interests. This realization is likely why Beijing feels an increased sense of urgency to 
resolve differences sooner rather than later. While it seems beneficial to allow lower level 
entities such as ARATS to conduct opening moves with their Taiwanese counterpart 
without preconditions, Beijing still fails to compromise its position because of legitimacy 
concerns. Compromising on the “one China” principle is clearly not in the PRC’s 
reunification agenda in the near-term unless dramatic changes occur within the current 
central Party leadership. 
Initiating opening moves comes down to a cost-benefit assessment by Beijing and 
Taipei regarding which side really stands to lose less by maintaining the status quo in the 
cross-strait relationship. As P. Terrance Hopmann points out: 
The party that can threaten the other with an outcome of nonagreement 
more credibly, because it stands to lose less from the failure to agree, is in 
a better position to demand a greater share from a cooperative outcome.123 
                                                 
121 Hughes, 158-159. 
122 Solomon refers to this type of strategy as “Killing the Chicken to Warn the Monkey.” This concept involves 
taking some limited-cost action that validates their willingness to carry out a more substantial threat (i.e. the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Straits crisis). Solomon, 104-105. For another viewpoint of Chinese negotiating styles see Ambassador 
Kagechika Matano, “Chinese Negotiating Styles: Japan’s Experience”, Center Occasional Paper, Asia-Pacific Center 
for Security Studies, Hawaii, December 1998. 
123 Hopmann, 114. 
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The above statement has direct applicability to the PRC position in the current stalemate, 
since CCP leaders have conditioned much of their regime legitimacy and nationalistic 
goals on the “one China” principle. On the other hand, without formal international 
recognition or legal basis to represent “one China,” Taiwan cannot commit to this precept 
and still see any real benefit in a cooperative outcome. Therefore, from each side’s 
perspective the status quo becomes a fait accompli until one side relaxes its preconditions 
for talks or the use of military force becomes the preferred alternative to unlock the 
stalemate. 
Based on these factors, maintaining a status quo cross-strait relationship becomes 
a rational goal for all parties. However, whether this status quo remains static or dynamic 
is truly the issue. As Denny Roy argues: 
Given that the political status quo will likely persist for the foreseeable 
future, the best hope to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait is that all three 
parties have been chastened and enlightened by the 1995-96 crisis and will 
strive to avoid conflict while buying enough time for evolutionary changes 
that might reduce cross-strait tensions.124 
The evolutionary changes mentioned above involve the ability to link communities across 
the strait in a manner that emphasizes cooperation while minimizing the potential for 
conflict. Any dynamic changes that occur in the tenuous relationship across the strait 
create the potential for miscalculation and destabilize efforts to promote dialogue. A 
                                                 
124 Roy refers to this option as a “chastened status quo” in the current cross-strait dispute. See Denny Roy, 
“Peace without Reunification: Promise and Problems”, The Legacy of the Taiwan Relations Act: A Compendium of 
Authoritative 20th Anniversary Assessments, (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999), 204-209. 
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“static” status quo creates the best environment for both sides to keep stability and 
economic prosperity at the center while future cross-strait relations move forward. 
C. THE U.S. ROLE IN SUPPORTING STABILITY AND DIALOGUE 
The United States plays an important role in efforts to see cross-strait integration 
lead to stability and cooperation. As of November 2000, both the PRC and Taiwan were 
among the top ten countries with which the U.S. trades, combining for approximately 
$167 billion dollars in trade for the year.125 This fact, combined with the requirement to 
maintain stability in the larger Asia-Pacific region, sets the stage for a U.S. policy 
approach that can support cooperative relations between the PRC and Taiwan yet hedge 
against Beijing’s threats to use force. It also accounts for the fact that maintaining peace 
in the Taiwan Strait becomes a clearly defined U.S. strategic interest. 
As in the past, the Bush administration will need to find a policy approach that 
keeps potential threats, opposing political values and human rights issues, and economic 
incentives in proper perspective.126 Regardless of the depiction of the PRC as a “strategic 
partner” or “strategic competitor” of the United States, the reality is that the U.S. role in 
cross-strait relations needs to encourage peace, stability, and prosperity. As Torkel 
Patterson, President Bush’s senior Asian advisor on the National Security Council, stated 
in an interview prior to assuming that position: 
                                                 
125 The PRC is the fourth largest U.S. trading partner and Taiwan ranks eighth. The PRC and Taiwan are also 
ranked first and sixth respectively in regards to countries that the U.S. has a trade deficit with. As of November 2000, 
the year to date deficit in millions of U.S. dollars with both countries totaled – 92,635.94. See “Top Ten Countries with 
which the U.S. Trades”, Available [Online]: <http://www.census.gov./foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance.html> [13 
February 2001]. 
126 For a recent analysis of current U.S. policy toward China and the three main actors that formulate the policy: 
the government, big corporations, and the military establishment see Franz Schurmann, Pacific News Service article 
based on a lecture given at the Nautilus Institute on April 13, 2001, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.pacificnews.org/content/pns/2001/april/intricatemix.html> [17 April 2001]. 
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I don’t think the US role in cross-strait relations will change dramatically 
under Bush’s administration…The US is going to do what it should do for 
its own interest, and China’s response to that is going to determine the 
quality of relations. In other words, you can’t blame the US for China’s 
reaction. China’s reaction is up to China.127 
The contextual nature of U.S. cross-strait policy is not only determined by Beijing’s 
reaction to U.S. foreign policy initiatives but also how well Washington responds to 
changing dynamics in the complex triangular relationship.128 Downplaying any looming 
military confrontation between the PRC and the United States over the Taiwan question 
will be an essential element of U.S. cross-strait policy. 
Any U.S. cross-strait policy approach must effectively balance official relations 
with the PRC and unofficial relations with Taiwan while at the same time protecting vital 
U.S. interests. Finding those areas of potential cooperation is essential to maintaining 
regional stability. As former President Clinton stated previously: 
China’s imminent entry into the World Trade Organization, made possible 
by the agreement we negotiated to open its markets and Congress’s 
passage of permanent normal trade relations, can be the most important 
development in our relationship with that country since we normalized ties 
in 1979…With permanent normal trade relations, we have made the right 
                                                 
127 Patterson, in regards to Taiwan, states: “I think the Taiwan Relations Act is the governing law in the US 
concerning US relations with Taiwan…The Taiwan-China relationship is a long-term or medium-term crisis. It’s not an 
immediate crisis.” See Monique Chu, “US Likely to Walk Similar Taiwan Strait Line”, Taipei Times online edition, 
December 18, 2000, Available [Online]: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/12/18/print/0000065982> [20 
January 2001]. 
128 A recent example of a changing dynamic affecting the relationship between all three sides was the collision of 
an U.S. surveillance plane with a PLA fighter aircraft over waters near Hainan Island. The subsequent landing of the 
U.S. aircraft on sovereign PRC territory and the detention of the U.S. crew until a negotiated settlement resolved the 
standoff served to highlight potential areas of confrontation in the future. Some analysts see this action as confirming 
the PRC is taking a more assertive and unpredictable approach to projecting military force in areas on its periphery that 
it claims as sovereign territory. See Michael Vatikiotis and Maureen Pao, “Just a Pawn in the Superpower Game”, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, April 26, 2001, Available [Online]: <http://www.feer.com/_0104_26/p014region.html> [25 
April 2001]. 
 70 
choice, to extend our hand rather than merely clenching our fist. Now we 
must build on it.129 
As each party keeps its focus on stability and economic interests at the center, an 
environment conducive to improved relations can move forward. By providing 
supportive rather than coercive economic and diplomatic incentives for both sides, the 
United States can best support integration efforts. In promoting a policy framework that 
avoids any type of future military confrontation with the PRC, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
states: 
China is too big to be ignored, too old to be slighted, too weak to be 
appeased, and too ambitious to be taken for granted…For America, that 
requires a strategically clearheaded management of the sensitive issue of 
Taiwan and, even more so, of the longer range task of fitting China into a 
wider and more stable Eurasian equilibrium.130 
A balanced U.S. approach that encourages the PRC to become a responsible actor in the 
international system while allowing Taiwan the opportunity to pursue its democratic 
system of governing is essential to long-term stability in the strait. 
1. Downplaying the Militarization of the Taiwan Strait 
The PRC is not a country the U.S. military can easily overwhelm in a regional 
conflict. Recent U.S.-led NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999 achieved rapid success in 
an isolated environment because of distinct differences in military size and capabilities of 
each opposing side. In contrast to Serbia, the PRC maintains a military of approximately 
2,480,000 regular forces, 1,200,000 reserves, over 3,000 combat aircraft, diverse naval 
                                                 
129 William Jefferson Clinton, “China’s Opportunities, And Ours”, New York Times, September 24, 2000. 
130 Brzezinski also states: “For America, Taiwan is a problem; China is a challenge. Taiwan complicates U.S.-
China relations, but it is U.S.-China relations that will determine in large measure the degree of stability or instability in 
the Far East and, more generally, in Eurasia.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Living With China”, The National Interest, 
Number 59, Spring 2000, 6-16. 
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assets that include 71 submarines, and a nuclear capable missile program.131 Although 
qualitatively backward compared to the U.S. military, the potential of the PLA to 
withstand a U.S.-led military operation in defense of Taiwan remains a negative factor 
for U.S. military planners. This factor weighs heavily on the decision-making process 
U.S. leaders would face in a future military confrontation over Taiwan. The possibility of 
a rapid, decisive U.S. victory is clearly not a significant deterrent against potential PRC 
use of military force carried out under the premise of defending its national sovereignty. 
The U.S. position in the defense of Taiwan is intentionally ambiguous and needs 
to remain so.132 The policy option to guarantee the defense of Taiwan based on an 
aggressive PRC action, often referred to as strategic clarity, is weak politically, militarily, 
and diplomatically. First, U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan Strait scenario will not 
receive UN approval because the UN does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and 
the PRC maintains a seat on the UN Security Council. Second, the PRC would likely 
                                                 
131 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 186-189. For an assessment of the PRC’s strategic posture see Robert A. Manning, Ronald 
Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, “China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment”, Chairman’s 
Report of a roundtable jointly sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Defense University, and the 
Institute for Defense Analyses, 2000, 15-58. 
132 A recent article reviewing U.S. cross-strait policy also highlighted the need to maintain a posture of strategic 
ambiguity to encourage a reduction of tension between the PRC and Taiwan. See Ronald N. Montaperto, James J. 
Przystup, and Gerald W. Faber, “One China and Relations Across the Strait”, Strategic Forum, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 173, September 2000. Although the press highlighted the fact that 
President Bush, in response to several questions pertaining to China attacking Taiwan, stated that the U.S. did have an 
obligation to defend the Taiwanese. His short response to the set of questions did not fully address the complexities of 
the potential decision-making process. Bush’s position was clarified in a later interview when he stated: “I think the 
Chinese must hear that ours is an administration, like other administrations, that is willing to uphold the spirit of the 
Taiwan Relations Act and I will do so. However, I think it’s important for people to also note that mine is an 
administration that strongly supports the one China policy, that we expect any dispute to be resolved peacefully and 
that’s the message I really want people to hear.” See “Presidential Milestone: U.S. Must Defend Taiwan, Bush Says”, 
Transcript of interview that aired on Good Morning America, April 25, 2001, Available [Online]: 
<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/GMA/GoodMorningAme…/GMA010425Bush_100days.htm> [25 April 2001] and 
“White House Report: Bush On One-China Policy”, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of 
State, April 25, 2001, Available [Online]: <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html> [26 April 2001]. 
 72 
argue U.S. intervention was an act of aggression under various articles of the UN 
charter.133 The lack of UN backing forces the United States to act unilaterally and makes 
coalition building difficult. Lastly, other negative factors in defining an outright 
guarantee to defend Taiwan with U.S. military intervention overwhelming outweigh any 
possible benefits from adopting a policy of strategic clarity. These factors include but are 
not limited to the following: 
• Taiwan may view the U.S. commitment as an unofficial backing to carry 
out more overt actions toward outright independence regardless of the 
stated U.S. “one China” policy 
• The absence of an East Asia regional security organization such as NATO 
forces the United States to carry out actions unilaterally 
• The lack of operability and integration with Taiwan’s military forces could 
prove detrimental, as both would likely be involved in defense operations 
• U.S. strategic allies in the region, particularly Japan and South Korea, may 
not view U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan question as a valid 
policy option and therefore withhold direct support 
An outright guarantee to defend Taiwan limits decision-making options and negatively 
influences the ability to foster cooperation leading to a peaceful resolution of cross-strait 
differences. 
2. Maintaining the TRA and the “One China” Policy 
Based on the above analysis and the common shared interests of stability and 
economic prosperity, the United States needs to continue to carry out its relations with 
                                                 
133 Based on the fact that Taiwan is not a member nation of the UN, under two principles in Chapter 1, Article 2 
of the UN Charter, the United States is expected to “settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice is not endangered” and “refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” See “Charter of the United Nations”, in A. Leroy Bennet, 
International Organizations: Principles and Issues, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 467-468. Conversely, this is the 
reason why some argue for Taiwan to be included as a full-fledged member of the international community and gain 
UN recognition. This would afford Taiwan protection under international law against the threatened use of military 
force by the PRC. See David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “No Place Like Taiwan”, Washington Times, May 10, 
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Taiwan and the PRC in keeping with the TRA and the three communiqués 
respectively.134 This includes, as Ralph Cossa states: “absent some obvious PRC 
provocation, Mr. Bush would do best by allowing the proposed Taiwan Security 
Enhancement Act (TSEA) to lie dormant.”135 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should continue 
via the TRA but need to provide, as David Shambaugh states, “deterrence without 
provocation.”136 This approach has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait for over twenty 
years and has provided a firm foundation for efforts to let integration lead to peaceful 
resolution of historical cross-strait divisions. 
Although some strong supporters of Taiwan in the U.S. government see gaps in 
the existing TRA, a more balanced assessment clearly points to the continued usefulness 
and validity of the existing legislation in governing Washington’s unofficial relations 
with Taipei.137 The current TRA is a known entity, from each side’s perspective, and is 
acknowledged, though under protest by the PRC, as a vital aspect of the Taiwan question. 
                                                 
2000. 
134 As Susan Shirk states: “Our role should not be as a mediator but instead as a contributor to an environment in 
which the two sides can take good ideas and build on them...For the U.S. to play this role effectively and instill 
confidence, agreement between the legislative and executive branches on policy in the region is essential. And we must 
have a policy that will be supported by the American people. The experience of the TRA over the past twenty years 
provides a useful model for us to follow.” See Susan L. Shirk, “The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty”, Testimony 
Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington D.C., April 
14, 1999, Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov.html> [27 September 2000]. 
135 Cossa also posits that “cooperative engagement and managed competition” will likely guide future relations 
between Beijing and Washington. See Ralph A. Cossa, “U.S.-China Relations: Avoiding ‘Tests’”, PacNet Newsletter, 
#2, January 12, 2001, Available [Online]: <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0102.html> [15 February 2001]. 
136 David Shambaugh, “The Taiwan Prescription is Deterrence Without Provocation”, International Herald 
Tribune, April 23, 2001. U.S. arms sales must also provide Taiwan with defense capabilities while not crossing the 
delicate line of sparking an arms race in the region. See David Shambaugh, “What Taiwan’s Military Really Needs”, 
International Herald Tribune, April 22-23, 2000, William Perry, “The Danger In Asia: An Arms Race”, Los Angeles 
Times, April 27, 2000, 15, and Erik Eckholm, “Experts Try to Make Missile Shield Plan Palatable to China”, New York 
Times, January 28, 2001, 1.  
137 See Jesse Helms, “Defending Taiwan”, Washington Times, January 9, 2001 and Statement of Dr. Kurt 
Campbell, 15 Sep 1999, 61-65. 
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The TRA provides balance in the complex triangular relationship and serves as a 
deterrent against conflict. Additionally, it assists each side in the dispute to view the 
military option to resolve cross-strait differences as a lose-lose-lose proposition. 
Although the United States cannot rule out a military policy option should aggressive 
PRC actions warrant such a response, it can, however continue upholding a policy of 
strategic ambiguity under the existing TRA. This policy assists in downplaying the 
militarization of the Taiwan Strait, deterring PRC military aggression, and provides an 
incentive for each side to resolve differences peacefully on their own terms without 
outside intervention. 
An unchanged U.S. “one China” policy also remains a cornerstone of efforts to 
promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Any new deviation from this consistent 
course of U.S. policy could dismantle efforts to resolve the Taiwan question peacefully. 
Although Beijing uses this principle to gain advantage over Taiwan in the international 
system, the United States has never endorsed all three components of the PRC-defined 
“one-China” principle. The PRC position includes: 
• There is only one China in the world 
• Taiwan is part of China 
• The government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the 
whole of China138 
The United States has intentionally not agreed to the PRC defined position in an effort to 
keep U.S. cross-strait policy as impartial as possible. 
                                                 
138 Frank Ching, “What does ‘One China’ Mean?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 2000, Available 
[Online]: <http://www.feer.com/_0005_11/p29.html> [6 May 2000]. 
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Instead of accepting a PRC-defined principle that casts aside all U.S. support for 
Taiwan, the United States made a decision when it normalized relations with the PRC to 
acknowledge that: 
Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict…The 
Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China...Within 
this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.139 
The ability to carefully state a U.S. position that did not disrupt the delicate relationship 
between all parties involved in the dispute was the right move in the past. This carefully 
constructed policy clearly remains the right approach for current and future initiatives to 
maintain peace in between both sides as well. The United States needs to see the futility 
of taking sides in the dispute and therefore must continue to provide support by 
encouraging peaceful exchanges and dialogue across the strait. The method to achieve 
this balance involves not becoming a third party mediator focused on negotiating a 
peaceful settlement but instead maintaining the TRA and the “one China” policy as the 
cornerstones of U.S. cross-strait policy. 
                                                 

































The unresolved Taiwan question continues to challenge the PRC, Taiwan, and the 
United States. However, some hope remains that all sides involved in the dispute can 
come to the realization that promoting stability and encouraging constructive cross-strait 
dialogue are the means to a peaceful end. The historical cross-strait divisions and the 
evolution of opposing political systems and ways of life in the PRC and Taiwan have 
created a formidable barrier to improved relations. Nonetheless, common strategic 
interests of stability and economic prosperity can pave the way for maintaining a “static” 
status quo environment that deters conflict and integrates the communities across the 
strait until constructive dialogue resumes. 
Ultimately, the will of the 1.2 billion mainlanders and the 23 million Taiwanese 
can overcome political, military, and economic factors to resolve the longstanding 
dispute peacefully. This peaceful solution will only come about after a long-term process 
of linking the two cross-strait communities by way of exchanges of goodwill and 
cooperation. Unlike the Cold War deterrence strategy of mutually assured destruction, an 
action plan to resolve the Taiwan question peacefully must come about from a strategy of 
mutually assured peace. In implementing this plan, each side can agree to disagree on 
precepts to resume talks, develop constructive dialogue, downplay the militarization of 
the Taiwan Strait, and eventually integrate by means of gradually improved cross-strait 
links. 
 78 
As the people of the PRC and Taiwan work on reconciling their differences the 
United States must play a supportive, balanced role. This approach must focus on 
removing the stigma of U.S.-China policy being the battleground in the post-Cold War 
world. Although the United States must carry out its policies from a powerful position in 
the international system, maintaining a balanced relationship with both the PRC and 
Taiwan promotes regional stability and protects other vital U.S. interests. While engaging 
the PRC with proactive diplomatic and economic initiatives, the United States must 
continue to carry out policies that deter unwarranted PRC acts of aggression and do not 
neglect the close unofficial relations with the governing authorities of Taiwan. By 
maintaining a posture of strategic ambiguity and a cross-strait policy built on the three 
communiqués and the TRA, the United States can reduce the likelihood of future conflict 
while encouraging each side to develop peaceful mechanisms to resolve differences. 
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